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INTRODUCTION
Precedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds its logical
importance or legal force.... Sometimes, to be sure, there is a reason for
a measure of uniformity, and sometimes there is enough similarity in the
circumstances to explain similar outcomes; but more often it seems that
there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under the
'
shadow of soine dramatic and conspicuous precedent.
*

Associate Professor of Law, Emory Law School. A.B.

1994, Princeton; J.D. 1997,
"Boilerplate ":

Yale.-Ed. I am grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, for his invitation to panicipate in the

Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium at the University of Michigan Law School, and for his
invaluable counsel. Many thanks also go to Howard Abrams, Bill Bratton, Bill Buzbee, Bill Camey,
Han Choi, Mitu Gulati, Marcel Kahan, Russell Korobkin, John Pottow, Robert Schapiro, and
William Whelan, as well as the participants at the "Boilerplate " Sy mposium and colloquium atten
dees at the University of Colorado Law School, for their advice and assistance. Finally, I appreciate
the efforts and contributions of my research assistants and the editorial staff of the

Review.
I.

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 67-68 ( 1 960).
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That boilerplate is pervasive is hardly surprising. In a variety of ways,
standardized terms in day-to-day contracts serve an essential cost-saving
function. By this measure, one might expect less frequent reliance on boi
lerplate in high-value contracts among sophisticated parties. Yet standard
terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the sophis
ticated. Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to
craft comprehensive and detailed, but also particularized, contracts, such
parties will commonly conclude agreements comprised heavily of tradi
tional terms--contracting norms of a sort-rather than terms tailored to the
2
distinct features of their particular bargain.
Examples of seemingly suboptimal but persistent contracting norms
the choice of standard contract terms over Pareto preferred tailored ones
are abundant. Several scholars have highlighted the longstanding inclusion
of unanimous action clauses in sovereign debt contracts, notwithstanding
3
the widespread perception of such terms as inefficient. To similar effect,
Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan have pointed to the standard put-at-par
remedy offered in event risk covenants, as well as the use of a standardized
4
rating decline trigger, as suboptimal technologies. Bill Bratton, finally, has
noted the curious absence of business covenants restricting the creation and
5
offering of certain new classes of preferred stock.
Why do such standard terms-a species of boilerplate-persist notwith
standing the ready opportunity of sophisticated parties to abandon them in
favor of tailored terms more suited to their particular circumstances? Two
explanations have most commonly been offered. To begin with, reliance on
standard terms may minimize the transaction costs of drafting and negotiat
ing contract terms. Yet the representation of sophisticated parties by
2.
Various scholars have focused attention on boilerplate usage by sophisticated parties,
including under the rubric of "The Form." See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate
and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REv. 953 (2006); William W.
Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convenible Bonds, 1 984 Wis. L. REV. 667;
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination
of Sovereign Bonds, 5 3 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004); Claire A Hill, Why Contracts A re Written in "Le
galese '', 77 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 59 (200 1 ); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate "), 83 VA. L. REV. 7 1 3
( 1 997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation]; Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or .Management Entrench
ment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 93 1 ( 1 993) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in

Bonds].
3.
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the
Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 69 1 , 694 (2004).
4. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation, supra note 2, at 75 1 ; Kahan &
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 962.
5. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 689. Other examples of suboptimal boilerplate can also be
identified, including the difficult-to-justify use of a weighted-average approach to calculating con
version price in convertible bonds, see Michael A Woronoff & Jonathan A Rosen, Understanding
Anti-dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1 29 (2005), the calculation
of anti-dilution adjustments based on the entire amount of a paid dividend, rather than simply the
portion of the dividend that exceeds the threshold amount permitted, see Marcel Kahan, Anti
Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2 S TAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 47, 1 55 ( 1 995), the warrant
formula utilized in convertible debt, see id. at 1 58, and the standard anti-dilution provision for the
sale of assets, see id. at 1 59.
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sophisticated counsel arguably limits the significance of additional drafting
6
or negotiation costs and potentially enhances the returns on tailoring. When
a sophisticated party is engaged in complex contracting with another sophis
ticated party, thus, the transaction costs of tailoring any given term may be
quite small as measured against the cost of contracting generally. Complex
contracts among such parties, meanwhile, are more likely to constitute par
ticularized transactions, maximizing the return on additional negotiation and
draftsmanship.

7
An alternative model, developed by Michael Klausner and others, posits
that network effects in the choice of contract terms may favor reliance on
widespread norms. Among sophisticated parties, however, potential network
inefficiencies may be readily remedied through internalization of the posi
tive externalities at work. Such parties have the resources necessary to
finance the introduction of alternative networks of contract terms or shifts to
8
available alternatives. Perhaps for this reason, competing networks of boi
lerplate terms can be found within markets populated by sophisticated
9
parties. With the availability of such an alternative, in tum, network effects
necessarily constitute a more limited barrier to deviations from the prevail.
IO
mg standard .
While transaction-cost and network-effect theories surely offer some ex
planation for sophisticated parties' reliance on conventional. usages or terms,
6.

This concept is echoed in the analysis of default rules in corporate law. In that context,

many have questioned the significance of default rules given the ease with which drafting parties
can tailor individually optimal terms. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990).
7.

See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
see also Ahdieh, supra note 3; Kahan & Klausner, Standardil,ation and Innova

L. REV. 757 (1995);

tion, supra note 2.
8.

By way of example, Kahan and Klausner have explored the role of underwriters and

outside counsel in such internalization, while Gillian Hadfield and Eric Talley have considered the

possibility of private production of corporate law. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardii.ation and Inno
vation, supra note 2, at 736-40; Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision
of Corporate Law (Univ. of S. Cal. CLEO Research Paper No. C04-13; Univ. of S. Cal. L. & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 04-18, June 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=570641; see also S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Extemality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 1. EcoN. PERSP., Spr. 1994, at
133, 141-42.
9.

The persistence of alternative networks of sovereign debt restructuring terms for much

of the last century is a ready example.

See Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 698-99; Choi & Gulati, supra

note 2.
10.

Other explanations for the use of standardized terms have also been offered. Of particular

note are network-related "learning effects," which arise from past use of given terms rather than

their potential future use (as with network effects). See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2, at 719-25.
Particular implications of the latter might include a fear of inadvertently becoming subject to regula
tion, based on use of a new contract term, and the greater potential for litigation around a less
widely used (or at least less familiar) term, given existing precedent. Boilerplate might therefore be
seen as offering greater control to the drafting party in shaping any future contract interpretation
than would arise from any attempt to adjudicate the parties' intentions. In addition to such learning
effects, inertia and related behavioral patterns have also been cited to explain the use of boilerplate.

See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). While each of these theories may
explain some part of the use of boilerplate by sophisticated parties, further exploration may nonethe
less be useful.
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Boilerplate may serve additional

functions in bargaining among sophisticated parties-and perhaps even in
12
contracting generally-than the above models suggest.
Specifically, I
would supplement existing transaction-cost and network-effect theories with
what I will term a "strategic" theory of boilerplate.
A strategic conception of boilerplate begins with a sense of bargaining
as characterized by both coordination and conflict. Thinking about bargain
ing-whether in contracts or elsewhere-is often oriented to the dimensions
of conflict between the parties. This is hardly surprising, given how much of
what is interesting about the interaction of bargaining parties hinges on the
divergences in their preferences, payoffs, and resulting strategies. In point of
fact, however, the essential dynamic in bargaining is one of coordination.
Contrary to the rhetoric sometimes used to describe bargaining, the ultimate
goal is not to win but to agree. Agree on one's preferred terms, no doubt, but
13

agree nonetheless.

Given the resulting mix of coordination and conflict in bargaining, it is
necessary to think carefully about the nature of communication in contract
negotiations. Although bargaining is-at some level-synonymous with

communication, direct communication may not be the most effective tool in

bargaining. Given a dimension of conflict, negotiating parties may rarely
mean what they say or say what they mean. In the pursuit of coordination,
14
then, alternative means of communication may be necessary.

Adherence to (or deviation from) the contracting norms of a given in
15
dustry-which I construe as a form of boilerplate -may serve just such
communicative functions. Specifically, I consider two related but distinct

1 1.

In this spirit, Todd Rakoff's exploration of potential theories behind the use and en

See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 74 ( 1983 ).

forcement of form contracts deserves mention.

12.

David Gilo and Ariel Porat have offered an extended enumeration of potential roles for

See David Gilo & Ariel
The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, I 04 MICH. L. REv. 983
(2006).
boilerplate in the particular context of standard-form consumer contracts.

Porat,

1 3.

See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. I do not mean to suggest that bargaining

parties would prefer any agreement over a failure to agree. Naturally, agreement must fall within the
contracting universe acceptable to both parties.

See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. The

ultimate goal within any given negotiation, however, is to agree.

1 4. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, La w 's Signal:
A Cueing T heory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 2 1 5 , 239-41 (2004).
1 5.

It is not

boilerplate in the sense of some particularly fixed language that is at issue

herein, but rather the consistent inclusion of certain conventional contract provisions-contracting
norms or standards of a sort.

In slightly different terms, the present analysis might be seen as di

rected to terms that are not negotiated by the parties but fixed for inclusion in advance of any

Cf Shmuel I. Becher, A Fresh Approach to the Long-Lasting Puzzle of Consumer Stan
8 (May 2005) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with
author); Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, Ft.A. ST. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with author). Thus, the operative question presented
negotiation.

dard Form Contracts

herein is why sophisticated parties propose and incorporate certain conventional terms rather than
tailoring more particularized terms. Most broadly, this can be understood as a question of standardi
zation generally, including both its motivations and mechanisms.

March
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functions that boilerplate may serve in contract bargaining, particularly
among sophisticated parties but perhaps more generally as well. The first is
a signaling function. In the case of boilerplate, however, the signal of inter
est derives not from the substance of the relevant term but from its character
as a standard rather than tailored term. Additionally, I consider potential
coordination functions of boilerplate that rest on the nature of boilerplate as
16
a focal point in bargaining. In this pair of signaling and coordination func
tions, one might find the foundations of a strategic theory of boilerplate.
What do I mean to capture with a strategic approach to boilerplate? In
broad terms, the language of strategy calls attention to the potential use of
boilerplate as a mechanism for parties to seek affirmative advantage in bar
17
gaining. In this vein, I invoke recent Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling's
seminal-if perhaps still inadequately appreciated-Strategy of Conflict,
which explored strategic conduct as "conscious, intelligent, sophisticated
18
conflict behavior [in contests the] participants . . . try to 'win.' "
In emphasizing a sharply instrumental intent behind the use of boiler
plate, I highlight strategy in a further sense. When boilerplate is used for
strategic reasons, it concerns ends beyond the particular choice of terms.
The intent of the party pressing boilerplate terms is divorced, at least in a
direct sense, from the content of those terms. The strategic use of boilerplate
is about something more than the content of the relevant term.
Finally, the strategic analysis of boilerplate herein serves to call attention
to an affirmative role for focal points in law. Focal points have been widely
referenced in the legal literature but predominantly in what might be
characterized as a passive form. In Schelling's terms, legal scholars have
focused on the role of focal points in "tacit coordination"-situations in
19
which conflict (as well as communication) is lacking. But the most
significant role of focal points-including boilerplate terms-is strategic.
Focal points do not simply exist; they can be created to help parties secure
advantage in conflict and bargaining. In its attention to focal points, then, a

16.

Other strategic functions of boilerplate might be identified as well, although they are not

emphasized herein. At least three potential "control" functions of boilerplate usage are noted
at notes

30, 142 & 144.

infra,

17.
Cf Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1 996 J. D1sr. REsoL. 325,
326 (defining "competitive bargaining"). It bears noting, however, that just as simple contracts may
not evidence an absence of "venality" or "self-interest" in contract negotiation, see Karen Eggleston,
Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. R E V 9 1 , 1 1 8-19 (2000), neither may the proposed use of standard terms.
.

See SCHELLING, supra note 1 , at 3-4; see also Robert D. Cooter, Stephen Marks &
Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 1 1
J. LEGAL STUD. 225 ( 1 982); Richard K . Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. RE V. 299, 300
( 1 990) ("Strategy is the design of conflict. . .. [O]nce the potential for hostility arises, strategy is the
process of structuring the conflict around the means for winning it."); cf Samuel R. Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial,
90 MICH. L. REV. 3 1 9, 328 ( 1 99 1 ) (referring to Mnookin and Kornhauser's notion of strategy as
1 8.

litigant behavior misrepresenting "intentions, desires, or chances of winning in order to obtain an
advantage in settlement negotiations"); Robert H. Mnook:in & Lewis Kornhauser,

Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 972-73 ( 1 979).
1 9.

See SCHELLING, supra note 1 , at 54, 57-58.

Bargaining in the
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strategic analysis of boilerplate may have implications for legal analysis
more generally.
My analysis begins with an acknowledgement of the mixed-motive char
acter of bargaining and suggestion of the resulting distortion of direct
communication in contract negotiation. Parts II and III explore the pair of
strategic functions noted above. The former considers the potential signaling
functions of boilerplate in bargaining, exploring both more conventional
signals of character and potential signals of group identity. The latter turns
to the coordination functions of boilerplate. After further describing the na
ture of bargaining as a coordination game and suggesting the resulting
applicability of Schelling's focal point paradigm, I successively consider the
potential role of boilerplate in both the presence and the absence of commu
nication--cases of "explicit" and "tacit" bargaining.
Part IV concludes by considering various implications of a strategic the
ory of boilerplate. Among other implications, I posit that notions of
bargaining power are necessarily altered within such a theory. Additionally,
the approach I propose offers both descriptive and prescriptive lessons for
the evolution of boilerplate and for expected bargaining patterns around boi
lerplate. Finally, if boilerplate has the focal effects I describe, I suggest that
the concerns associated with adhesion contracts may arise even in the pres
ence of bargaining parity.
Collectively, these implications offer important lessons for our under
standing of contract barg3.ining. As a descriptive matter, the use of
boilerplate by sophisticated pa,rt:ies may owe much to its strategic functions.
Even where strategy has historically played little role in the use of boiler
plate, however, the analysis and implications offered below suggest the
value of greater strategic thinking among sophisticated parties in their use
of boilerplate.
I. CONFLICT, COORDINATION, AND COMMUNICATION IN BARGAINING
In thinking about the dynamics of bargaining-whether contractual or
otherwise-we commonly focus on the dimension of conflict in the relevant
interaction. In this perspective, parties have divergent interests that drive
their bargain with one another. Each hopes to bargain its way to a greater
potential share of the contractual (or similar) surplus. To this end, the parties
push, cajole, and otherwise negotiate with each other.
In reality, however, the heart of bargaining is not conflict but coordina
20
tion. Bargaining parties' operative goal is to reach agreement. This requires
terms to which both parties can agree-in essence, terms around which they
21
can coordinate. This primacy of coordination is evident when we think
20. I do not mean to suggest that conflict is Jacking in bargaining. Divergent preferences are
no less essential to a dynamic of bargaining than the common goal of coordination. Without some
such conflict, "bargaining" ceases to be worthy of the name. My point is merely to emphasize the
more commonly overlooked dimension of coordination that is also at work.
21.
The subject of coordination, as I will elaborate infra, is the parties' expectations of one
another. See Thomas C. Schelling, Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War, I CONFLICT
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about the desired ends of contract negotiations as opposed to litigation. In
bargaining, neither party seeks to crush its opponent. Notwithstanding
sometimes loosely used rhetoric, neither aspires to a contract that is

truly

one-sided. Such a contract would, predictably, be rejected. Instead, each
22
party wants the best deal that it can actually get. By contrast, the goal in

litigation may be unvarnished victory; dismissal with prej udice is likely to
23
be an attractive outcome to the civil defendant.
If both coordination and conflict are present in bargaining, however,
how do they actually play out? What is the balance of coordination and con
flict in bargaining? B argaining, I would suggest, rests on parties' common
goal of coordination; the path to that end, however, is littered by their tacti
cal efforts to secure advantage. Thus, each party desires the best possible

price; each wants its favored warranty terms, and the like. But each one only
wants as much as it can have while still preserving the prospect of agree
ment. On the playing field of bargaining, then, coordination is the goal, but
the participants' successive plays are directed at securing advantage in suc
cessive areas of conflict.
This pattern is readily captured in game theory. Contract negotiation and
24
The incentives of play
25
ers thus favor the achievement of some coordination equilibrium.
Bargaining is not, however, a pure coordination game. As in the B attle of the
other forms of bargaining are coordination games.

Sexes, in which husband and wife wish to spend an evening together, but
each prefers to spend it at a different venue, bargaining parties seek to agree,
26
but would prefer to do so on their own terms.
Within this pattern, one must think carefully about the nature of com
munication. Although I will offer an important caveat below-in the form of
what Thomas Schelling termed "tacit bargaining"-bargaining is ordinarily
grounded in communication. The nature of communication in bargaining,
however, is shaped in important ways by the mixed motives at work. In light
RESOL. 1 9, 20 ( 1 957); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Sur
vival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 45, 7 1 .

22.

Benjamin Franklin, perhaps unsurprisingly, put i t well:

Trades would not take place unless it were advantageous to the parties concerned. Of course, it
is better to strike as good a bargain as one's bargaining position permits. The worst outcome is
when, by overreaching greed, no bargain is struck, and a trade that could have been advanta
geous to both parties does not come off at all.
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33 ( 1 982) (quoting Franklin).

23. Some concession to each side may be valued even in litigation, given its potential to
diminish the prospect of appeal, to enhance the likelihood of voluntary compliance, and the like.
24. "[T]he process of agreeing to a set of contractual terms is a coordination game."
Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 1 2; cf Rakoff, supra note 1 1 , at 1 222 (suggesting role of forrn
contracts in facilitating coordination).
25. See Utset, supra note 2 1 , at 7 1 -72 (describing coordination game dynamic in negotia
tion, and potential for coordination failure: parties "may literally talk past each other and fail to
reach a bargain"); see also F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 1 9 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 33, 51 ( 1 990); Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86
HARV. L. REV. 797 ( 1 973).
26.

See Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 240 n. l 02.
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of the element of conflict within the quest for coordination and, perhaps
more significantly, the pervasive dimension of conflict in the negotiation of
any single term, there is both more and less to communication in bargaining
27
than we might otherwise imagine.
Given a degree of conflict, in essence, ordinary communication may not
serve the ends of coordination. Even if parties hope to achieve some coordi
nation equilibrium, if they diverge as to their preferred equilibrium, the
28
reliability of oral communication declines. I may neither mean what I say,
nor say what I mean. In such circumstances, other means of communicating
intentions, interests, and incentives, as well as other asymmetrically held
information-means such as Schelling-style "focal points"-may be criti29
cal .

This is the backdrop for the present analysis. My inquiry concerns how

both adherence to and deviation from boilerplate might serve a party's
communicative goals in bargaining. Such goals may occasionally be of a
mutually beneficial character. Thus, the relevant communication may serve
to remedy Pareto suboptimal information asymmetries and thereby enhance
the collective contracting surplus. At least as often, however, the communi
cative impact of boilerplate may be intended to advance the particular
interests of the drafter. In either case, the information communicated arises
not primarily from the substance of the term proposed but from its character
as either boilerplate or a tailored term. 30

27.
Cf Schelling, supra note 21, at 31-32 (suggesting that the line between explicit commu
nication and tacit communication may be difficult to draw in the context of bargaining); David A.
Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO.
L.J. 61, 119-20 (2003). On the whole, the function of communication in bargaining rests on the
premise of information asymmetries of one variety or another.
28.

See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 239-41.

See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 112. On the difficulties of relying on communication,
see Goodpaster, supra note I 7, at 342-43 (''The information the competitive negotiator seeks is the
29.

other party's bottom line. How much he will maximally give or minimally accept to make a deal. On
the other hand, the competitive negotiator wants to persuade the other side about the firmness of the
negotiator's own asserted bottom line. The competitive negotiator works to convince the other party
that it will settle only at some point that is higher (or lower, as the case may be) than its actual and
unrevealed bottom line.").

30. Beyond the signaling and coordination functions I explore herein, one might also posit
an "agency control" function of sorts. Principals might use boilerplate to control their agents. This
has been suggested with reference to form contracts by numerous authors. See, e.g., Avery Wiener
Katz, On the Use of Practitioner Surveys in Commercial Law Research, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2760,
2769 (2000); cf Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. EcoN. REV. 281, 287-88
(1956) (suggesting utility of reliance on agent in limiting expectations of any potential deviation by
the principal). By dictating the inclusion of certain terms in one's contracts up front, and thereby
foreclosing negotiation of these terms, corporate entities may constrain the discretion available to
their agents. This can occur both through the requirement of certain process boilerplate or the dicta
tion of substantive terms. In the former case, one might point to the standard inclusion of a merger
clause and a no-oral-modification clause. See Rakoff, supra note I I, at I 223-24. Substantively,
corporate entities might dictate the inclusion of particular substantive terms such as a unanimous
action clause.
Such control of agents may be especially important for the sophisticated contracting parties of
interest herein. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 967-68; Stewart Macaulay, Private Legis
lation and the Duty to Read-Business by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Canis, 19
VAN D. L. REV. 1051, 1059 ( 1966); cf Becher, supra note 15, at 9 (describing constraints imposed on
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SIGNALING FUNCTIONS OF BOILERPLATE

Boilerplate may facilitate important signaling functions in contract bar

gaining. Signaling involves the communication of information that cannot
be effectively communicated through explicit statements of intention or
3
character. 1 The offering of a warranty, for example, communicates private
information in the hands of the manufacturer regarding the character of the
product (or the character of the manufacturer), which could not be commu

nicated by explicit assurances of product quality alone.32

agents by standard-form agreements). Sophisticated parties might thus wish to adopt a firm com

mitment to certain boilerplate terms in order to more effectively constrain the discretion of their
agents in contract negotiations. Cf Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 110-12. Large institutions
with concomitantly large numbers of agents and concomitantly wide discretion in the hands of those
agents-might have particular need for a mechanism to constrain the discretion of those charged

with negotiating their many contractual obligations. The required use of certain boilerplate in all
contracts, or all contracts of a particular variety, might essentially be seen to serve this purpose. See
Rakoff, supra note 11 at 1 223 (suggesting effectiveness of corporate hierarchy as only theory of
enforceability of adhesion contracts: "In private organizations, as in public bureaucracies, discretion
is power-and this is true of discretion at the bottom of the hierarchy as well as at the top."); see
also Macaulay, supra, at 1 059.
Such use of boilerplate as a mechanism of constraint might be seen to apply most directly to

those employees of the relevant institution who are responsible for contract negotiations. P erhaps
even more significantly, however, it may apply to external agents, including outside counsel. The
latter may be especially prone to deviation from the principal 's aims for any number of reasons. To
begin with, they have an incentive to minimize costs, potentially favoring distinct standardized terms

or contracts. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 353-55 (1996)

(describing potential for agents to favor standardized terms). Additionally, and following directly
from this, external agents may have their own preferred drafting models. Finally, outside counsel's
potentially greater repeat player character in a given market, as well as relatively greater autonomy
from the principal (as compared to other internal agents), may also increase the relative utility of
boilerplate as a mechanism of control of outside agents.
Claire Hill's analysis of the use of "The Form" in large-firm legal practice calls further atten

tion to attorneys' own agendas in contract design. See Hill, supra note 2, at 62�3. Boilerplate-based
constraints on counsel might also be seen as a cost-saving device. See Eggleston et al., supra note
17, at 1 20. Similar arguments, in tum, can be made about investment bank agents in corporate fi
nance. Kahan and Klausner's treatment of the independent role of investment banks in facilitating
contract standardization can thus be understood as a story of agency costs. See Kahan & Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation, supra note 2, at 755. A slightly different example, of course, arises
when companies rely on form contracts including a merger clause for use by their sales agents. See
Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1223.

31.
"A signal is a costly behavior that can communicate information about the sender when
the receiver knows that only senders with a particular characteristic can afford, or are willing, to

send the signal." David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 879, 882-83 (2003); see also Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in
Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. & TucH. 149, 193 (2001) (noting that signals can potentially arise either
from words or deeds).

32. See Hetcher, supra note 31, at 193; Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contract
ing, 90 VA. L. REV. 2 1 87, 2222 (2004). The signaling role of boilerplate in bargaining that I propose
echoes analysis of the impact of default rules on bargaining. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, IOI YALE L.J. 729
(1 992); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 6 1 5, 6 1 7 ( 1 990).
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A . Signaling Character

Signaling is most commonly conceived to communicate information re
33
garding the character of a party, transaction, or product. Signals might
offer information regarding the reliability, viability, or capacity of a poten
34
tial trading partner, or the costs or risks of a particular deal. Such
communications may enhance either collective contracting efficiency or a
particular party's share of the contractual surplus. Signals may play an espe
cially significant role in doing so where direct communication is
undermined by the presence of some degree of conflict, as in contract nego
35
tiations and other bargaining dynamics.
The present argument is distinct from ordinary treatments of signaling,
as the signal of interest herein arises not from the substance of the term of
36
fered but from the proposed term's consistency with or deviation from the
37
preexisting contracting norm. When a warranty is conceived as a signal of
product quality, the notion is that the manufacturer's willingness to stand
behind the product communicates private information regarding the prod
uct's reliability. Likewise, a signaling conception of unanimous action
clauses in sovereign debt instruments posits that they communicate a
38
debtor's commitment to avoid default. Here, by contrast, the notion is that
the adoption of or the failure to adopt a standard term-whether it be a war
ranty or warranty disclaimer, or a unanimous action clause or collective
action clause--communicates certain information, independent of the sub39
. .
stance of the prov1s10n.

33.
"One detects signals attributed to general character traits, such as responsiveness, de
pendability, and honesty." Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B. U. L.
REV. 457, 464 (2001) (footnote omitted). The signaling function is widely relied on in the law and
economics literature to describe behavior intended to communicate information regarding the char
acter or nature of a particular individual, institution, or product. See ERIC A. PosNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS 18-19 (2000).
34.
See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 117; see also Ruben Kraiem, Leaving Money on
the Table: Contract Practice in a Low-Trust Environment, 42 Cot.UM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 715, 736
n.31 (2004) ("[P]eople will behave in a trustworthy manner, or comply with a given set of social
norms, simply for fear of incurring reputational or other social sanctions. . . . [T]here is a signaling
component to one's behavior, independent of whether one has or has not internalized the relevant
norm. ").
35.

See supra Part I.

Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow characterize this as the "direct value " of the relevant
term. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 3.
36.

37.
With an eye to default rules, Ben-Shahar and Pottow have made analogous observations
regarding the signaling effects of standard terms and offered potential examples of this pattern. See
id.
38.
See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest
of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. I, 52 (2004 ); Choi & Gulati, supra note 2, at 939.
39.
The notion of boilerplate signaling I suggest is directly in line with Ayres and Gertner's
suggestion that a party may adhere to a suboptimal default rule in order to conceal private informa
tion regarding the subject matter of the relevant term. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 32; see also
Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 109-10. As Korobkin suggests, however, adherence may also be
motivated by a desire to conceal information independent of the relevant term. See Russell Korob
kin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 620 (1998).
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As explored in the legal literature, signals might generally be grouped
into

affirmative

words or deeds designed to signal information regarding the

speaker or actor, and statements or moves by a party designed to elicit

sponsive

signals from another party. By

re

dint of certain standard or

conventional commitments, a party can effectively signal that it will be a
4
suitable contracting partner. 0 Conversely, but still strategically, a party may
also rely on the proposed use of boilerplate to elicit signals from its negoti

ating counterpart about the latter's character. In these successive cases, the

proposed use of boilerplate might respectively be said to produce pooling
and separating equilibria.

1. Affirmative Signals
The proposed use of boilerplate may produce a pooling effect of sorts in

speaking to the character of the proposing party or the transaction it pro
41
poses. A willingness to rely on boilerplate terms might be seen to signal

the absence of any elevated risk of default, litigation, or the like, or the ab
4
sence of flaws in the particular transaction under consideration. 2 Thus, a

party proposing boilerplate would seem to place itself and the relevant
4
transaction at some median level of risk. 3 In other terms, the proposed use
of boilerplate could be seen to signal the absence of private information ad
44
verse to the potential counterparty. In essence, it signals the absence of any

undisclosed reason for standard terms to be less attractive to the relevant

party.

Business covenants in both indentures and private loan agreements sug

gest potential examples. The absence of covenants ordinarily included in a

particular type of debt instrument-including certain debt and investment

40. Naturally, a party may also signal its lack of reliability. See Jeffrey Evans Stake & Mi
chael Grossberg, Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law,
73 IND. L.J. 535, 539 (1998) (discussing signaling problem inherent in suggesting entry into prenup
tial agreement).
41. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Nonns, and Economic Meth
odology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 (2001) (book review); see also Hetcher, supra note 31, at 195 ("To
distinguish themselves from bad types, good types engage in actions that are called 'signals.' Signals
reveal type if only the good types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone
knows this.").
42. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Nonns and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J.
59, 7 1 -72 (1 993); Korobkin, supra note 39, at 621; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:
Fann, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1165 n.213 (2003). Lisa Bernstein has spoken
of the "relational costs" of deviation from a norm. Such costs might arguably be greater among the
sophisticated, repeat player parties of interest herein. Cf Bernstein, supra, at 74.
43. See Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with
Fewer Words?, 79 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 889, 899 (2004) ("[E]ach party needs to expend costs to con
vince the other party that it is not using strategic handles itself.").
44. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 32. As Ayres and Gertner's default rules analysis makes
clear, the strategic use of boilerplate may potentially work both in the affirmative and in the nega
tive. The proposed use of boilerplate may not only help signal positive information but also may
serve to conceal adverse information.
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45
covenants -would likely constitute an important adverse signal to credi
tors. One can appreciate as much with respect to the various types of event
risk covenants, as used in the aftermath of the 1988 leveraged buyout of
RJR Nabisco. At the outset, limited hostile control change covenants
46
strongly favorable to management interests-were the norm. Relatively
quickly, however, more generally advantageous dual trigger covenants
47
emerged as the standard. On these facts, some adverse signal might be ex
pected to arise from an issuer's continued use of the older standard.
Additionally, however, early shifts to the newer standard may have offered a
signal of private information regarding greater prospects of hostile takeover
activity, given a correlation between use of dual trigger covenants and such
48
activity. In the design of the particular event risk covenant used, moreover,
further signals might be found, as with the inclusion of a more limited col
lection of triggering events than was conventional-for example, the
exclusion of a change in board composition--or the offering of a less-than49
standard remedy.
As suggested by the foregoing examples, the bargaining opportunity sets
most suited to boilerplate's signaling effects are binary in nature. The starker
a choice-as in the choice between hostile control change and dual trigger
50
event risk covenants-the clearer the relevant signal. By contrast, the coor
dination functions of boilerplate are at their acme when bargaining parties
51
face an array of contracting altematives.
As the examples offered also suggest, the relevant boilerplate signal may
often have some significant temporal feature. The choice between hostile
control change and dual trigger event risk covenants involved a shift in the
52
contractual norm over time. Early movers offered one signal. Late movers
offered another. One might further expect that a pattern of early or late
45. See Marcel Kahan & David Yennack, Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt
Securities, 14 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 136, 1 42 ( 1 998).
46.

See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 952.

47.

See id. at 955.

48.

See id. at 975-76.

49. In the case of anti-dilution provisions, similarly, some broad signal might be offered by a
debtor's election to use the older conversion price standard versus a newer market price term. Such a
choice might be expected to signal a relatively narrower conception of the anti-dilution function. See
Bratton, supra note 2, at 687 n.76; Stanley A. Kaplan, Pierr:ing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti
Dilution Clauses in Convertible Securities, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1965); see also AM. BAR
FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 530 ( 1 971) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES]. More specifi
cally, private information pointing to heightened risk in a transaction might be signaled by the use of
a full ratchet provision for calculating conversion price. Such provisions are thus used primarily for
riskier transactions or amidst economic turmoil. See Woronoff & Rosen, supra note 5, at 1 47.
50. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 1 5, at 15-16, 2 1 ; cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note
32, at 739; Korobkin, supra note IO, at 1598.
51.

See infra note 140.

52. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2. Another exam
ple of a shift in boilerplate over time, giving rise to similar signaling patterns, was the disappearance
of debt covenants and restrictions on subsequent liens and dividends from the debt instruments of
large corporations between the 1970s and the mid- I 980s, and their replacement by negative pledge
covenants against added secured debt and by prohibitions on the sale and leaseback of assets.
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shifts in boilerplate usages would offer its own, distinct signal. While not all
boilerplate signals will have this character, one might expect some temporal
element to often be present in complex contracting, with its gradual shifts in
boilerplate over time. 5 3
Most importantly, however, as to each of the above examples, it is essen

tial to appreciate a signal of interest that is entirely independent of the
substance of the relevant provision.54 While the substantive choice of term
offers some signal on its merits, it also offers a distinct signal as boilerplate

or deviation from boilerplate. This becomes clearer when we consider the

range of potential proposals to deviate from boilerplate, with changes ad
verse to the non-drafting party at one end of the spectrum (and suggested by

the examples above), and changes of seeming benefit to the non-drafting

party at the other. In the case of adverse deviations from boilerplate,
the abandonment of a norm

and the substantive shift to a less

both

favorable term

communicate a negative signal to the other party. Minimally, the deviation

from boilerplate to offer less favorable terms enhances the strength of the
substantive adverse signal.

When one considers proposed deviations that are seemingly beneficial to

the non-drafting party, however, this correlation disappears. In the choice

between a hostile control change or a dual trigger form of event risk cove

nant, for example, it bears noting that a relatively uncommon third form
highly favorable to creditors-was also available. Pure rating decline cove

nants-triggered by

any

rating decline, regardless of cause--deviated from

boilerplate, yet offered much more favorable terms to the non-drafting
party.55
In such circumstances, the distinction between the signal arising from

boilerplate deviation and that arising from the substantive choice of term
emerges more starkly. Given such divergence, however, there is at least the

prospect that even a favorable deviation from boilerplate could constitute an
adverse signal.56 This may simply be an issue of raising suspicions regarding
the reason for the deviation-suspicions not susceptible to alleviation

53.

Cf Korobkin, supra note 1 0.

54.

In their analysis, Ben-Shahar and Pottow are occasionally ambiguous in drawing the line

between what they term the "direct value" signaled by a given term, and the signal arising from its
character as a boilerplate or tailored term.

55.

See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 1 5 , at 1 2- 1 3 .

See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, a t 958-60. An

other example of this pattern might be an issuer's use of the less borrower-friendly terms of the
original,

1 983 Model Simplified Indenture ("MSI''), rather than the 1 999 revision. The persistence
5.01 of the 1983 MSI, and their elimina
tion under Section 5.02 of the 1 999 version, might constitute a particular example. Compare Model
Simplified Indenture, 3 8 Bus. LAW. 741 , 755 (1 983) (section 5.01 ), with Revised Model Simplified
Indenture, 55 Bus. LAW. 1 1 1 5, 1 1 35 (2000) (section 5.02).
of obligations subsequent to a sale of assets under Section

56. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 1 5 , at 2-3; Gilo & Porat, supra note 1 2; Hill,
supra note 2, at 69 (noting that even improvements in "The Form" may constitute negative signal);
cf Korobkin, supra note 39. Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser suggest that even the addition of
language "to protect the other against one's own opportunism" may constitute an adverse signal. See
Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 1 8-19. At the extreme, one might conceive of below-market
offers to sell or offers to buy at a premium in this light. Attractive as they may be, such offers may
also raise questions. See,

e.g., id. at 109-10.
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through communication, given the mixed motives in play. Among the so
phisticated parties of interest in the present analysis, this possibility may be
especially significant. Proposed deviations from boilerplate by unsophisti
cated or unrepresented parties might be written off as devoid of any
meaningful signal. By contrast, a sophisticated party and its even more so
phisticated counsel are more likely to intend something when they deviate
57
from standard terms. When made by counsel, seemingly favorable devia
tions from the norm may be more likely to be interpreted as craftiness than
as simple concession.
Notably, such adverse signaling may arise even from the most minimal
58
of deviations. Even small changes raise the question, "Why?" Perhaps
more importantly, small changes may raise questions as to what further
59
changes are hidden within ''The Form." The selection of particular terms
from the less borrower-friendly 1983 Model Simplified Indenture ("MSI"),
for example, rather than the revised 1999 MSI, might trigger concerns about
6()
the entire range of choices made in the relevant indenture.
One might also appreciate the adverse signals attending even favorable
deviations from boilerplate within a private information framework. As sug
gested above, the proposed use of boilerplate might be seen to signal a lack
of private information. Deviations toward terms less favorable to the non
drafting party, by contrast, might suggest the presence of such information.
The proposal of non-boilerplate terms favorable to the other party, however,
is no different. It still signals private information; it is simply favorable in
formation. Yet such indication of private information may raise concern
1
about the presence of other private information.6 Stating it differently, it
may raise questions about why the party offering the favorable term cannot
compete effectively with standard market terms. Why might the party need
to offer a premium? Going a step further, the deviation from boilerplate to
offer preferred terms might be seen to indicate an unwillingness or perhaps
inability to be subject to the market. Such an offer might signal a party too
anxious to make a deal. Use of a rare, pure rating decline event risk cove
nant might be expected to trigger such an adverse response, alongside its
2
substantive signal of creditworthiness. 6

57. See Hill & King, supra note 43, at 899 (describing negotiations among sophisticated
parties of verbiage to be used in contract as searches for "strategic handles or ambiguities that the
other party might exploit").
58.
Cf Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 09-10 (noting employer's potential offer of higher
sales commission as signal of private information of low sales).
59. See Hill, supra note 2, at 72, 79 (suggesting worries about adverse signaling may deter
even obvious improvements in the forms utilized within large law firms, let alone innovations).
60.

See supra note 55.

61. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 1 7 (describing challenge of "unknown un
knowns"); see also id. at 19 (suggesting suspicions likely to arise from deviations from default
rules); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1825 (2000) .
62. Elimination of the standard contractual disclaimer of consequential damages would be to
similar effect. Cf Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
1 227, 1270-71 & n.205 (2003).
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Aside from its adverse or positive effect, favorable deviations from boi
lerplate might also signal particular understandings or conceptions of the
drafting party. Anti-dilution provisions in corporate debt, for example, have
63
been conceptualized in a variety of ways. By offering anti-dilution terms
more favorable than the norm, a party might signal its particular understand
ing of the nature of anti-dilution protections.
In the broadest terms, even favorable deviations from boilerplate may
simply call attention to the relevant drafting party or the deal it proposes.
Such heightened attention may sometimes be favorable, but may also be
unwelcome. This does not mean, of course, that any deviation from boiler
plate, no matter how favorable, will constitute an adverse signal in toto.
Rather, when the substantive change in term is sufficiently favorable, the
attendant benefits are likely to drown out any negative signal that the devia
tion from boilerplate sends. Deviations from the contracting norm may be
problematic, by contrast, where they offer only limited substantive benefit to
a counterparty.
Finally, the foregoing may suggest the possibility of thinking about the
role of boilerplate in bargaining in somewhat distinct terms from those de
scribed above. As already pointed out with reference to disadvantageous
deviations from boilerplate, the abandonment of a standard term may mini
mally strengthen the force of the substantive adverse signal. Similarly, when a
party proposes favorable deviations from boilerplate, the boilerplate's function
might be to establish a negotiating benchmark against which the deviations
will more strongly communicate a positive signal. In this conception, the af
firmative functions of boilerplate in bargaining can arise from adherence or
from deviation. Once boilerplate sets a baseline, in essence, favorable devia
tions from it-for example, a debtor's election of a pure rating decline
covenant or use of the original MSI-may offer an even clearer positive sig
nal. As I will suggest below, then, a repeat player might be seen to benefit
from defining a relevant contracting norm distant from its reservation point
not only for substantive reasons, but also to ensure its consistent ability to
64
offer favorable deviations from the norm and a resulting positive signal.
2. Responsive Signals
Each of the foregoing aspects of boilerplate's signaling functions
arises similarly in the use of boilerplate not to disseminate information but
to elicit it. Just as the proposed use of boilerplate may trigger a pooling
equilibrium of sorts by suggesting a median level of risk and lack of pri
vate information in the hands of the drafting party, it may also produce a

63.

See supra note 49.

64. See infra Section IV.B. Again, it bears recalling that the utility of-and p erhaps the need
for-such signals derives from the limits on direct communication in bargaining, given the presence
of some dimension of conflict alongside an operative dynamic of coordination. See supra Part I.
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separating equilibrium of sorts. In essence, it may permit the identification
5
of more risky counterparties or transactions.6
A party may be a less attractive contracting partner for a variety of rea
sons, including a relatively greater propensity for default or tendency to
66
litigate upon default. When a party resists proposed boilerplate, the draft
ing party may be signaled of some such greater risk. The median contracting
party might be expected to be amenable to standardized terms. By contrast,
a party more at risk of default or more prone to litigation is more likely to
7
seek particularized terms pertaining to such contingencies.6
Others have discussed this possibility, though primarily with reference
68
to the use of standard-form contracts of adhesion. In this line of analysis,
the use of adhesion contracts can be understood as a means to discoura�e
higher-risk counterparties from contracting or to force such parties to reveal
69
their risk profiles. Yet the same principle may operate more broadly ; it may
play out with form contracts generally. Under the present analysis, it may
arise from any proposed use of the contracting norm, even within generally
non-standardized contracts. As to such terms, some signaling of adverse
information regarding a potential contracting partner may obtain from that
70
partner 's desire to deviate from proposed boilerplate.
Here, a binary dimension to the choice between the standard term and
the alternative is likely to be even more relevant than with the affirmative
71
signals discussed previously. In the case of responsive signals, furthermore,

65.

See Gilo & Porat, supra note 12, at 988-89, 990-92.

66. See Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tux. L. REv.
1581, 1586 (2005) ("[O]ne reason sellers will not negotiate with consumers over changes to a form
contract . . . may be that the consumer who asks to negotiate signals to the seller that he may be
litigious, or otherwise a troublemaker"); cf Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social
Norms, 200 1 U. ILL L. REV. 867, 875 (suggesting range of information about partner that might be
effectively signaled).
67. See Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 110 (A party "will be less suspicious if the pro
posed contract is a standard contract, rather than one ostensibly tailored to today's individual
circumstances, because a simple standard contract, which applies to heterogeneous circumstances, is
less likely to exploit individualized asymmetric information . . . . Therefore, asymmetry of informa
tion may lead parties to use equivalent contracts over a broad range of circumstances, even
though optimality would require heterogeneous and context-specific contracts."). In the-perhaps
unlikely-alternative, a willingness to accept boilerplate without revision might also be seen to
signal a prospect of gross default, and consequent disinterest in dickering over contract terms. The
responsive signal elicited by the proposed use of boilerplate may consequently be inflected with
some degree of noise.
68. See, e.g. , Paul Watford, Contractual Liability in Intellectual Property Disputes-A Case
Study: Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp. 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269, 277-78 ( 1 994)
(discussing negotiation options for parties faced with adhesion contracts).
,

69.

See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 109-10.

70. This pattern might be readily captured by boilerplate provisions for the non-assumption
of debts and liabilities in the case of an asset sale. A counterparty's resistance to such a provision
may signal the presence of hidden debts or liabilities. Standard provisions providing for the arbitra
tion of disputes might also be a relevant example. In this case, demand for authority to pursue other
means of legal recourse might signal a greater likelihood of, or at least a greater willingness to en
gage in, dispute. See Korobkin, supra note 62, at 1 270 & n.205.
71.

See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.

March 2006)

The Strategy of Boilerplate

1 049

the signal attaches even less to the substance of the deviation demanded by
the non-drafting party than to the very demand for deviation. This is evident
with respect to favorable deviations sought by non-drafting parties. In the
latter case, the non-drafting party is not writing on a clean slate. Rather, it
has before it a boilerplate provision drafted by its counterparty. To affirma
tively reject the boilerplate term and demand a deviation harmful to one's
substantive interests would be expected to raise all the suspicions outlined
72
above, y et even more forcefully.
B. Signaling Group Identity
Besides providing evidence of the character of a party or the nature of a
73
particular transaction, signals may provide other types of information. For
instance, the use of certain boilerplate might be the norm for a particular
type of actor or group. A party's proposed use of that boilerplate, then,
75
74
might help to signal its identity or group membership.
An example of this pattern-in which the choice of particular boilerplate
signals information regarding the type of drafting party-might be the stan
dard use of one or the other of two alternative boilerplate terms to govern
76
alterations in the financial terms of sovereign debt contracts. Bond con
tracts issued under English law have historically included a standardized
provision requiring the consent of a supermajority of bondholders for any
77
change. Sovereign bonds issued under New York law, by contrast, included
78
a standard term requiring the unanimous consent of all bondholders. The
use of one boilerplate term or the other thus helped signal that the contract
was an English-law or New York-law bond. More significantly, it was seen
as some signal of the grouping of the borrower within the category of either

72.
One might reasonably predict that the strategic payoff from the invocation of boilerplate
as a signaling device would be characterized by diminishing returns. Over time, the information to
be offered or elicited through boilerplate usage is likely to be discounted through some internaliza
tion of the potential returns from any such strategic use of boilerplate. In the presence of significant
information asymmetries, however, some significant-even if diminished-signaling effect might
nonetheless persist. The noise in the information signaled would necessarily increase as negotiators
absorb the utility of strategic behavior. Even then, however, it may constitute the best information
available.
73.
See Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 109-10. For example, in the context of trade se
crets, "[a]n important function of security measures is to signal to competitors and the public what
information belongs to the business." Jermaine S. Grubbs, Comment, Give the Little Guys Equal
Opportunity at Trade Secret Protection: Why the "Reasonable Efforts " Taken by Small Businesses
Should Be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. R.Ev. 42 1 , 429 (2005).
74. For example, proposing use of the model swap agreement of the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association offers some signal of the proposing party's conception of itself.
75.
Howard Abrams has suggested a reading of Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Interna
tional Sales Corp. , 190 F. Supp. 1 1 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1 960), as involving a signaling of group membership
by the contracting parties.
76.

See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

77.

See Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 698.

78.

See id. at 698-700; Choi & Gulati, supra note 2, at 938.
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79
low-risk or high-risk debtors. For this reason, emerging market debt was
80
commonly issued in New York. By issuing in New York, higher-risk debtors
sought to signal their preferred inclusion within the grouping of lower-risk
debtors, who could more readily afford a unanimous action requirement and
81
its greater constraints on their future ability to restructure their debt.
Although a less familiar signaling paradigm, such signaling of group
identity may offer an even clearer case of the signaling effects of boilerplate.
When some sufficient consistency can be observed between particular pro
visions and the users of those provisions, boilerplate may serve an important
classification function.
In sum, some signaling function may be an important element in the
strategic use of boilerplate. In essence, by proposing the use of boilerplate, a
bargaining party may convey certain information regarding the character
and relative risks of the party itself and the proposed transaction. A party
may also be able to extract valuable information regarding its counterparty.
Finally, in appropriate circumstances, boilerplate may help to communicate
identity. In each of these ways, the use of boilerplate may serve important
.
f
82
expressive unctions.
.

Ill. THE COORDINATION FUNCTIONS OF BOILERPLATE
The use of boilerplate in bargaining may play an important role in facili
tating agreement at an equilibrium favorable to a particular party. Because
of the multiple equilibrium dynamic of bargaining, some extrinsic mecha
nism will often be needed to define the parties' ultimate point of agreement.

79. Cf Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 707 (discussing concern among debtor states that changes to
standard bond terms to make restructuring easier might increase borrowing costs or exclude debtor
nations from international debt markets).
80.

See id. at 698-700.

8 1 . Other examples of boilerplate terms indicative of group identity might also be offered. A
simple case might be the inclusion of a certain type of certified warranty, distinct to a particular
group of assertedly "high-quality " producers. In the case of debt instruments, the consistent inclu
sion of business covenants in junk bonds and their consistent exclusion from investment-grade
bonds in the 1 980s, see William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: legal Theory in a
Time of Restructuring, 1 989 DuKE L.J. 92, 140 & n.2 1 1 , made the presence of such covenants an
effective signal regarding the nature of the relevant issuer. An even clearer example might be the
early move to dual trigger covenants, a signal potentially placing the relevant issuer in a category of
issuers prone to hostile takeover. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra
note 2, at 975. To similar effect would be the inclusion in a convertible security of anti-dilution
provisions directed to information barriers, which provisions are used primarily by private compa
nies and public companies with thin trading. See Woronoff & Rosen, supra note 5, at 133. Yet
another example mentioned above would be the use of full ratchet anti-dilution provisions, with the
attendant implication of the relative riskiness of the issuer. See id. at 145-47. Finally, following
from Kahan and Yermack's analysis of the use of covenants in convertible debt securities, one might
construct the presence of covenants as a classificatory signal of sorts. See Kahan & Yermack, supra
note 45, at 1 42-44.
82. See SCHELLING, supra note 2, at 1 15. The term "expressive" is one that Schelling himself
used. Id. It has since been popularized in the legal literature. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson &
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503
(2000) ; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 1 44 U. PA. L. REv. 202 1 ( 1996).
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In this exercise in coordination, boilerplate may offer a "focal point" of
sorts, facilitating resolution of the game.
A. Conflict and Coordination in Bargaining
As described at the outset, contract bargaining is fairly understood as a
83
type of coordination game. Characteristic of such games is the presence of
multiple equilibria. Rather than a single stable solution, an array of potential
outcomes, once reached, exhibit significant stability.84 Bargaining parties
might thus reach myriad potential deals over any individual term of their
85
agreement or the agreement as a whole.
How, then, do parties solve the coordination game of contract bargain
ing? Three scenarios present themselves, assuming each party has some
range of acceptable outcomes, from its ideal outcome (that is, near-complete
capitulation by the counterparty) to its "reservation point"-the least favor
8
able outcome the party would be willing to accept. 6 Given the existence of
such a range for each bargaining party, the first possibility is no overlap. In
87
this case, there is no game at all, as the parties simply cannot agree. Next,
there is the possibility that the parties' bargaining ranges abut one another.
In this scenario, of course, only one equilibrium is common to both parties.
If that point can be identified in bargaining, contracting will occur; other
88
wise, it will not. Again, however, there is no game.
It is only when the parties' bargaining ranges overlap that multiple equi
89
libria and a resulting game of coordination emerges. In numerical terms,
one can imagine a party on one side who is willing to sell for any price
greater than $4.00. The buyer, meanwhile, is willing to take the item for free
or to pay anything up to $6.00. In this dynamic, any price between $4.00

83.

See supra Part I.

84. This multiple equilibrium dynamic in coordination games is often contrasted with the
more familiar pattern of the Prisoner's Dilemma. While players' incentives favor defection in the
Prisoner's Dilemma, no player can be expected to deviate from the equilibrium achieved in a coor
dination game. See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 230.
85.
If all contract terms are efficiently priced, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 203, 1 209-10 (2003), it
bears noting that the implications of non-price negotiations are necessarily limited. Yet any number
of constraints, including bounded rationality, see id. at 1222-25, and asymmetric information, may
limit such contracting efficiency. Further, asymmetric valuations-including asymmetric risk pref
erences-may also create some enhanced utility from the negotiation of particular contract terms.
See Korobk:in, supra note 6 1 , at 1 8 1 3-14.
86. I borrow the terms of the negotiating process-"reservation point," "bargaining zone,"
"commitment point," and "deal point"-from Russell Korobkin. See Korobkin, supra note 6 1 , at
1 792, 1 794.
87.

See Mnook:in & Kornhauser, supra note 1 8, at 975.

88.

But see Schelling, supra note 30, at 292 n.6.

89.

See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 235.
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and $6.00-any point within the parties' "bargaining zone"-should induce
90
agreement.
But on what price-at what "deal point"-will the parties actually
agree? Along the undifferentiated scale from $4.00 to $6.00, anything is
91
possible, including a failure to contract. If some point of agreement is to be
reached, however, bargaining power is generally expected to define it. In
essence, one would predict a solution at, or at least relatively closer to, the
92
preferred outcome of the party most capable of resisting concessions. In
the terms of the Rubenstein bargaining solution, for example, the party with
greater capacity for patience-the party facing lower costs of delay-will
93
likely secure a price closest to its preferred result.
Yet why is $6.00 the deal point dictated by a dominant seller's bargain
ing power rather than $5.00? In essence, this price would appear to leave too
much of the surplus with the relatively "powerless" buyer. Yet even if the
seller's bargaining power drives the result to the outcome most favorable to
the seller yet still within the contracting range of the buyer, the seller does
not know whether the buyer's reservation point is $5.00 or $6.00. Recall the
dynamic in bargaining, in which players actively compete to secure favor
able terms while maintaining an orientation to the ultimate goal of
94
coordination--of agreement. Within this dynamic, each party will ration
ally seek to define a "commitment point"-a point beyond which it claims it
will not concede further-at some remove from its reservation point. The
greater the distance that its asserted commitment point stands from its true
95
reservation point, the better.
Each party thus seeks to define a commitment point as close to its pre
ferred end of the contracting spectrum as possible. But how do they do so?
If the buyer's real reservation point is $6.00, how might she credibly draw a
line at $5.00, or lower? Given a coordination dynamic, the seller is fully
aware of the buyer's shared preference to reach agreement. As a result, the
seller can be expected to push against the buyer's asserted unwillingness to
pay more than $5.00, and to demand $6.00, then $7.00, and so on. When
does this pattern come to an end? Naturally, one bound is the buyer's reser
vation point-$6.00 in our example. But the buyer prefers to pay less.
How-if at all--can she define a lower price from which she will not con
cede further?

90. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 6 1 7; Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1792-94, 1 8 17. Howard
Raiffa effectively captures this dynamic in schematic terms. See RAIFFA, supra note 22, at 46.
9 1 . See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the
Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 328-30 (2003).
92.

See infra note 1 77.

See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COM
PETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 300--01 (199 1 ); Russell Korobkin,
Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REv. I, 1 0-- 1 1 (2002).
93.

94.

See supra Part I.

95.

See RAIFFA, supra note 22, at 44-65; see also Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1793, 1 808.
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96

In coordination

games generally-with or without a dimension of bargaining-the operative

goal is to coordinate player expectations. Success depends on each party 's

ability to make accurate predictions of what the other party will expect of
97
In the most basic, pure coordination game-in which interests are

it.

aligned-this is readily apparent. A husband separated from his wife in a

department store, without the ability to communicate with her, must develop
98
some expectation of where his spouse will expect him to go. Absent such
expectations, his choice of location becomes random and error-prone. What,

then, might be the source of such expectations-and resulting coordina
tion-in contract bargaining?

B. The Focal Point of Boilerplate
In its coordination functions, boilerplate may play an important role in

shaping expectations. Specifically, boilerplate may serve a "focal point"

function in contract bargaining. Assessing the question of how to solve co
99
In

ordination games, Thomas Schelling posited a role for "salience."

multiple equilibria games--circumstances in which more than one stable

solution is possible-Schelling argued that solutions could not be found

within the strictures of a mathematical model. '00 Instead, he offered the no

tion of "focal points"-equilibrium solutions that distinguish themselves as
unique in some way to parties pursuing coordination-as the key to resolu
tion.

In this conception, each party selects its strategy

and resulting

96. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 20; see also SCHELLING, supra note I , at 70; Korobkin,
supra note 6 1 , at 1 793, 1 802; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1 8, at 973. Schelling writes:
Each party's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each
knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which
neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the
other expects the first to expect, and so on. Somehow, out of this fluid and indeterminate situation
that seemingly provides no logical reason for anybody to expect anything except what he expects to
be expected to expect, a decision is reached. These infinitely reflexive expectations must somehow
converge on a single point, at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.
SCHELLING, supra note 1 , at 70.
97.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 1 9-20.

98.

See id.

99. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1 649, 1 658 (2000); see also Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, The Nature of Salience:
An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 658, 661 ( 1 994)
(referring to "Schelling salience" as psychological theory of coordination).
1 00. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1 264 n.83 (2004). The
attempt to select a point of agreement among multiple equilibria, Schelling posited, is less "rational"
than intuitive-even artistic. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 2 1 , 22 ("Poets may do better than
logicians at this game."); see also RAIFFA, supra note 22. It requires what might today be termed
"fuzzy logic." Party A needs to determine what Party B will expect Party A to expect Party B to be
willing to accept, and so on, for agreement at that point will offer Party A the greatest share of the
contractual surplus.
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coordination point-its meeting place in the department store-based on
wi
what point it expects the other party to find salient.
Within this paradigm, if a particular point stands out, it will predictably
emerge as the equilibrium solution absent communication. Each party will
expect the other to select the prominent point as the likely solution and will
therefore choose that point itself. The ultimate coordination point, thus, is
simply the one that commands attention as the obvious place for agreement;
the winner of the bargain, in turn, is the party whose preferred bargaining
wz
outcome sits closest to that point. Assuming a commitment to coordina
tion, the other party cannot withhold its acquiescence and demand greater
compromise, for the proposed solution offered by the focal point is the only
solution that can effectively align the parties ' expectations.to) Focal points
thus determine the outcome of a coordination game by shaping individual
104
expectations of the likely behavior of other individuals.
Describing the role of focal points in facilitating coordination, Schelling
began with cases of "tacit coordination"-interactions characterized by both
an absence of communication ("tacit") and an alignment of player incentives
("coordination"). When player interests are aligned, lack of communication
is the sole obstacle to efficient resolution of the game. ws In such a dynamic,
the role of focal points is readily apparent. For the husband and wife sepa
rated in the department store, the focal point of the "lost and found" desk
106
however irrational it might be-emerges as the appropriate meeting place.
By contrast with any other equally good or even preferable meeting place, it
stands out and is consequently the best place for each spouse to go and
therefore to meet.
While the legal literature has looked to focal points primarily in such
cases of tacit coordination, Schelling's most significant insights come as he
turns from pure coordination to a bargaining dynamic more apposite to the
present analysis. In "tacit bargaining," communication is still lacking, but

I 0 I . Schelling drew evidence of this pattern from a series of ad hoc empirical studies demon
strating that two parties attempting to coordinate without communication could typically intuit a
focal point based on common understandings and norms. See McAdams, supra note 99, at 1660-6 1 ;
see also Smith, supra note 42, at 1 1 29 ("Salience i s psychological prominence, and experimental
studies show that people are good at coordinating by converging on prominent solutions.").
1 02.

See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 58-59.

103.

See id.

1 04. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 1 00, at 1265 ("An equilibrium is focal if it has
some feature that draws unique attention to itself, making it stand out among all equilibria. . . . If for
some psychological, historical, or cultural reason, the players are aware that one equilibrium draws
special mental attention from all the players . . . . [t]he resulting expectations are self-fulfilling:
Once a player believes the other players are headed for a particular equilibrium, the player's best
response is to engage in the strategy associated with that equilibrium.").
105. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Steams, Beyond Counting Votes: The
Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1 849, 1 898 n.230 (200 1 ) (discussing role of
focal points and tacit coordination among U.S. Supreme Court justices during oral argument, when
they seek to form coalitions but their ability to communicate is limited); McAdams, supra note 99,
at 1 658-59.
I 06.

See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 54.
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player interests diverge. w7 Because coordination remains the goal, however,
focal points can continue to play a role. Schelling captures as much with his
tale of separated parachutists who must find each other, who have identical
maps of the terrain on which they have landed, but who cannot communi
108
cate. In this dynamic, Schelling predicts that both will walk to the most
prominent site demarcated on the map-on Schelling's map, a bridge-even
if that location stands significantly farther from one than the other. The
parachutists have distinct preferences for their meeting place based on how
far they must travel. Yet both will travel to the bridge due to its focal power
109
and consequent (perhaps exclusive) ability to facilitate coordination.
Yet Schelling ultimately goes further, to suggest that focal points may be
110
important in facilitating coordination even where communication is open.
In this conception, again going beyond most treatments of focal points
among legal scholars, the key to the role of focal points is not the absence of
communication; focal points are more than a substitute for communication
in facilitating coordination. In "explicit bargaining," focal points may serve
to redress the shortcomings of communication in the presence of conflict.
Recall that when player interests favor coordination at some equilibrium but
diverge as to the equilibrium preferred, communication may be an inade
quate mechanism of coordination. Into this breach, various types of focal
111
points-including boilerplate-may step in to play an essential role.
C. Boilerplate in Explicit B argaining
Before turning to the true focal point function I would propose for boi
lerplate in explicit bargaining, we might consider a related strategic pattern
in contract bargaining. As with the strategic decision to throw one's steering
112
wheel out the window in a game of "Chicken,"
boilerplate may play a

107.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 22.

1 08.

See id. at 20, 22.

109.

See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 54--5 5.

1 10. See Schelling, supra note 21, at 27; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering
Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 65 1 ( 1 976)
("Schelling suggests that two parties who are unable to communicate can concert their actions. . . .
He then argues that comparable considerations apply even in cases where the parties can communi
cate."). Thus, Schelling suggests that "[t]he 'coordination' of expectations [in explicit bargaining) is
analogous to the 'coordination' of behavior when communication is cut off; and, in fact, they both
involve nothing more nor less than intuitively perceived mutual expectations." See SCHELLING,
supra note 1, at 68.
1 1 1 . See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 1 12 ("There is evidence that the influence of focal
points is powerfully present even in explicit bargaining scenarios . In bargains that involve numerical
magnitudes, for example, there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. More
impressive, perhaps, is the frequency with which long negotiations over complicated quantitative
formulas converge ultimately on something as crudely simple as equal shares or shares proportion
ate to some common magnitude.").
1 1 2 . See HERMAN KAHN, ON EsCALATION 1 1 ( 1 965); Howard E. Abrams, Economic Analysis
and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 359, 363
n.26 ( 1 990); Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
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113
"credible commitment" function. A bargaining party might thus shape its
counterpart's expectation of concessions through a preexisting pattern of
boilerplate usage. Specifically, if a party consistently uses the same boiler
plate, neither accepting nor proposing deviations from it-even when there
might be some apparent gains from such deviation-negotiating outcomes
approximating that standard term are relatively more likely. The consistent
114
use of a term may therefore offer some bargaining advantage.
The choice of debt contract terms is again instructive. While publicly is
115
sued debt is not characterized by explicit bargaining, the provisions in
negotiated private loan agreements track public indentures in significant
11 6
part. A debtor's consistent use of a dual trigger event risk covenant would
117
likely buttress its capacity to insist on that form in future loan agreements.
To similar effect i s the enumeration o f triggers for anti-dilution remedies.
Longstanding provision for adjustments in the standard categories of
events-stock splits, stock dividends, non-cash dividends, and warrants
might allow a corporate issuer to resist pressure to provide adjustments for
1 18
other corporate acts such as cash dividends or tender offers.
Yet this calls attention to a critical caveat to this credible commitment
conception of boilerplate in shaping expectations in bargaining. Specifi
cally, the "boilerplate" at work is only so in a particular sense. The
analysis herein is about contracting norms or standards within a particular
industry or other context; I am interested in the value of adherence to such
shared norms. The credible commitment function described above, how
ever, arises with any contract term or form used consistently by the
119
drafting party, without regard to its broader usage. A debtor whose loan
agreements consistently offer adjustment only for stock splits, stock divi
dends, and non-cash dividends-but not an equally standard adjustment
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 , 1 09 n.43 1 (2000); Schelling, supra
note 30, at 294.
1 1 3. See Leonard J. Long, An Uneasy Case for a Tort of Negligent lnteiference with Credit
Contract, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 235, 266 (2003).
1 14. See SCHELLING, supra note 1 , at ch. 2; see also Gilo & Porat, supra note 12 at 1 0 1 6- 1 8.
Separately, Schelling has identified the potential for the credibility of a commitment to be enhanced
by the linkage of consistent usage to some relevant principle. See Schelling, supra note 30, at 291 . A
commitment to equality of treatment might be understood in this light. See Ben-Shahar & White,
supra note 2, at 968--09.
1 1 5 . One might imagine a construct in which underwriters represent a bargaining counterpart
to corporate debt issuers. Even more attenuated would be a theory of rating agencies as engaged
even if only very distantly-in bargaining with issuers. In neither case, however, do we have the
kind of explicit bargaining characteristic of competing parties. As to rating agencies, the relevant
pattern is actually closer to a pattern of tacit bargaining.
1 1 6. The use of standardized terms in loan agreements is of particular relevance to the present
analysis, moreover, given the lack of public trading of such debt and the resulting limits on network
effect explanations of standardization. See supra notes 7-1 0 and accompanying text.
1 17.

See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions i n Bonds, supra note 2 , a t 960, 967.

1 1 8.

See Kahan, supra note 5, at 1 53.

1 19.
Cf Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1 586. This suggests the interesting question of the focal
impact of a shift from one's own standard term to some more universally invoked boilerplate term.
In such a circumstance, one might imagine loss of the focal power of both points.
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for warrants-possesses similar credibility in its ability to hold that
ground as the debtor whose consistent usage tracks the wider norm. This
initial, credible commitment function of boilerplate in shaping bargaining
expectations, then, turns not on the use of a standard form, but on the con
sistent use of any form.
As the foregoing analysis of credible commitments in contract negotia
tions suggests, aspects of the role of boilerplate in shaping expectations
120
echo the signaling functions described above. Like signaling of the exis
tence (or absence) of private information or of information regarding group
identity, the consistent use of particular terms conveys information regarding
a relevant characteristic of a bargaining party. Thus, consistent use of stan
dard, dual trigger covenants might be said to signal both a median level of
risk and a relative inflexibility in bargaining. The implications of the infor
mation offered by boilerplate in its signaling and coordination functions,
however, are distinct. The former speak to the merits of the parties' transac
tion, while the latter concern the nature of their bargaining.
It is important not to overdo this distinction. Often the same information
will be in play in both signaling and coordination. Further, that information
may be conveyed by the very same speech or conduct. In this sense, one
could well bring both signaling and coordination under one common head
ing. I separate them, however, given the distinct ends to which the same
information, conveyed in the same way, is being put. The information atten
dant to the coordination functions of boilerplate speaks to a party's
expectations regarding the bargaining outcomes acceptable to its counter
part. In a sense, boilerplate's coordination functions go to process; they are
about the bargaining itself. By contrast, boilerplate's signals do not speak to
the expectations of a party in bargaining but to a party's character or private
information or to the nature of the proposed transaction. These are relevant
to the parties' bargaining, of course, but are more especially about the sub
stance of that bargain. They do not directly speak to what the other side can
expect in the negotiation process.
As noted above, a corporate debtor's proposed inclusion of a standard,
dual trigger event risk covenant might offer certain affirmative signals.
Among others, these would include evidence of the relatively conventional
risk profile of the debtor, the absence of private information regarding the
enterprise's vulnerability to takeover, and the plain vanilla character of the
transaction. The same debtor's consistent---even invariable-use of dual
trigger event risk covenants, however, might also influence a potential
lender's expectations of the likelihood of securing a concession to use a pure
121
rating decline covenant instead. While there is some link between the sig
naling and coordination functions of boilerplate, then, the crucial feature of
1 20.

See supra Part II.A.

121.

The use of a standardized anti-dilution formula to reduce conversion price-the standard

remedy-rather than a simple notice requirement or

an

outright prohibition might also be seen to

capture this distinction. While such standard usage offers signals regarding the issuer's fiscal stabil
ity, and likely financial needs, it also-if consistent-is likely to shape an investor's expectations in
attempting to negotiate the terms of a new loan agreement.
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the latter-and what makes it a distinct and particularly interesting element
in our understanding of the use of boilerplate by sophisticated parties-is its
122
orientation to player expectations.
Putting aside the credible commitment function of consistent use of a
given contract term, and acknowledging the distinction between the signal
ing and coordination functions of boilerplate, what of the true, focal point
function of boilerplate in explicit bargaining? To appreciate this dynamic,
we might begin by considering cases in which it might arise. Recall once
123
again the choice of form in the design of event risk covenants. At one
bound, a potential debtor might prefer to exclude any such provision. At the
other, the debtor might be amenable to go so far as to include a dual trigger
covenant with a limited set of triggering events and a put-at-par remedy at
95 %. The potential lender, meanwhile, might prefer a pure rating decline
covenant, but be prepared to fall back as far as a dual trigger covenant with
124
the standard list of triggering events. Within the resulting bargaining zone
between the parties' reservation points (that is, various forms of a dual trig
ger covenant), no particular solution stands out.
The same might be true in the design of anti-dilution protections for a
sale of assets when both debtor and lender agree on the inclusion of some
protection but diverge in their views of the appropriate mechanism and
125
form. In the face of a sale of all or substantially all assets of the debtor,
standard anti-dilution terms provide for convertibility to the new form of
126
equity offered to existing shareholders. Further, they provide for release of
the seller from its obligations and include a put provision for fundamental
127
changes in control.
But the American Bar Foundation's Commentaries
also identify potential alternatives, including merely requiring notice to
holders of convertible securities, imposing an outright prohibition on certain
corporate acts, or defining the potential triggering events, as well as reme
128
dies, in a range of ways.
One might imagine a debtor who prefers mere
notice but is determined to go no further in offering anti-dilution protection
than to offer the lower of a downward conversion or market price adjust
29
mene or, in the alternative, the standard terms above . The potential lender,
meanwhile, might be expected to favor prohibition but be amenable to the
standard terms or to a market price adjustment triggered by a relatively
comprehensive litany of triggers. Again, we find a gradation of potential
deals that .the parties might strike.
1 22.

On the distinct emphasis of signaling, see Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100.

1 23.

See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 960, 967.

1 24.

See id. at 967.

1 25.

See Bratton, supra note 2, at 684, 688 n.79; Kahan, supra note 5, at 1 59--60; see also

COMMENTARIES, supra note 49, at 527-28.

1 26.

See Kahan, supra note 5, at 1 59--60.

1 27.

See id. at 1 60--6 1 .

1 28.

See COMMENTARIES, supra note 49, at 527-29.

1 29. See Kaplan, supra note 49, at 29 (noting distinct theories behind market price and con
version price formulas for anti-dilution clauses).
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Most tangibly, we might recall the manifestation of this pattern with
130
price, as outlined above. Our buyer is prepared to pay up to $6.00, while
the seller wants at least $4.00. In such a situation, both parties would settle
for a price between $4.00 and $6.00. Outside that range, either buyer or
seller will demur. At all points except the bounds of the range, however,
each party is also prepared to accept a higher or lower price. Hence, our
difficulty.
In each of these cases, we have a multiple equilibrium game with no fa
131
cially apparent solution. Both parties stand ready to contract at some range
of points within a spectrum. At all points beside the very bounds of that bar
gaining zone, however, both parties are also prepared to agree to less
132
favorable terms. It is here that we find the need to coordinate expecta
133
tions. Each party must develop an expectation of how far its counterpart
134
is willing to concede, yet still contract. Where is the other party 's line in
135
the sand?
As suggested at the outset, communication cannot offer an adequate
136
solution to this dilemma. Because players are engaged in bargaining
because they seek to coordinate but have divergent interests as to their pre
ferred coordination point-communication is unlikely to include either
137
138
party's true reservation point.
Communication reduces to cheap talk.
Each party will insist that its asserted commitment point constitutes its res
ervation point. The debtor will assert its opposition to any event risk

1 30.

See supra notes 90--95 and accompanying text.

131.

This multiple equilibrium pattern might also arise in bargaining over other features of a

debt contract's anti-dilution provisions, including the potential prohibition of certain events, a re
quirement of notice, and the provision of one form of adjustment or another. See Bratton, supra note
2, at 684, 688 n.79; see also COMMENTARIES, supra note 49, at 527-28. In a completely distinct
contracting context, a multiple equilibrium dynamic might be found in the varied potential treat
ments of the right of assignment. From a prohibition on assignment, to its authorization with written
consent, its plenary authorization with continued liability, or its authorization generally, negotiating
parties face multiple potential bargaining outcomes.

1 32.

See Schelling, supra note 21, a t 29.

See Ahdieh, supra note 3, a t 732-33 (discussing difficulties in developing accurate ex
pectations among heterogeneous parties); Goodpaster, supra note 1 7 , at 344; Schelling, supra note
2 1 , at 20; cf David B. Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower 's Viewpoint, 28
Bus. LAW. 1 1 6 1 , 1 1 63 ( 1973) (suggesting coordinative power of boilerplate).
1 33.

1 34.

See Goodpaster, supra note 1 7, at 342-43, 344 ("Once the bargaining parties have as

sured their bottom lines or reservation values and have staked out their respective positions on the
bargaining range, nothing inherently seems to impel settlement at any particular point between the
positions, except each party's expectations regarding what the other side in fact will accept.").

1 35.

In enumerating the relevant unknowns, one might most broadly think of a counterparty's

value system. More specifically, a bargaining party is unsure of the other party's commitment to
certain outcomes, its willingness to take certain risks to secure preferred outcomes, and its desire
(and ability) to absorb certain costs to do so. Even absent conflicting interests, it should be relatively
apparent, such information is likely to be difficult to communicate. Once we introduce the conflict
of bargaining, this is even more obvious.

1 36.

See supra Part I.

1 37.

See id.

1 38.

See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 239.
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covenant, while the lender will insist that only a pure rating decline cove
nant will do. Further, our debtor will offer mere notice of a potential
dilution, at very best, while the lender will draw the line at an absolute bar.
Our buyer, finally, will insist that it can afford no more than a dollar or two,
while her counterpart seller will not part with her "mug" for less than
$9.00. 139 In each case, a party 's insistence on a particular deal point is read
ily countered by insistence on an alternative deal point and strongly
worded-almost boilerplate-assurances that no further concessions will be
made.
Within this dynamic, what is the strategic project of each party ? Along a
spectrum of potential points of agreement, how does one party maximize its
share of the contractual surplus? As noted, each hopes to establish a com
mitment point as distant as possible from its true reservation point as the
coordination point from which it will not concede further. Yet this is a task
worthy of Sisyphus if any given point of agreement looks no different than
any other potential point, including those immediately to either side of it on
1
the parties' spectrum of equilibrium solutions. 40
If some location-some focal po int -along the spectrum of shared solu
tions stood out or could be made to stand out, however, that point would
likely be important in defining the parties' expectations of what further con
1 1
cessions might be made. 4 In essence, if some particular point stands out
from others, a party's insistence on that specific equilibrium solution neces-

1 39.
Cf Korobkin, supra note 39, at 627-28 (describing experimental analysis of the endow
ment effect).
140.
See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 2 1 -22; see also Schelling, supra note 30, at 28 1-82
("There is some range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no
agreement at all. To insist on any such point is pure bargaining, since one always would take less
rather than reach no agreement at all, and since one always can recede if retreat proves necessary to
agreement. Yet if both parties are aware of the limits to this range, any outcome is a point from
which at least one party would have been willing to retreat and the other knows it! There is no rest
ing place.").
As suggested above, boilerplate's signaling functions are likely to be at their acme when rele
vant contracting choices have a relatively binary quality to them. By contrast, the coordination
functions of boilerplate-particularly in explicit bargaining-are likely to be most significant when
the parties face a range of potential equilibrium solutions. Most obviously, this is true because in a
binary contracting universe, both points are focal. One solution is focal because it is boilerplate; the
other is focal because it is not.
141.
See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100, at 1 266 ("Experiments confirm that, in
games of multiple equilibria, salient non-payoff features (focal points) significantly facilitate coor
dination."); cf Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide:
Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1 55, 1 7 5-76 (2004) (referring to
"multiple paths toward capturing the gains from cooperation and no obvious way . . . to converge on
one of them" (quoting Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Con
structing the European Community 's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173, 1 75
(Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1 993))). Korobkin's treatment of the status quo bias
can be understood in this spirit, as a theory of the role of the status quo--including boilerplate-in
coordination. See Korobkin, supra note 39, at 6 1 2 ; see also David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth
Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 975, 1 0 1 0-- 1 7 ( 1 998).
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sarily enjoys greater credibility a s a non-negotiable position. One can appre
1 42
ciate this with reference to boilerplate.
Faced with a range of potential deal points over a given contract term,
within a largely undifferentiated bargaining zone, one party might be able to
define a credibly firm commitment point by proposing the use of a standard
boilerplate term. 1 43 In essence, a party may be able to instill greater expecta
tion of its unwillingness to deviate from a given term-to concede further
when it proposes a boilerplate term. The proposed use of boilerplate may
thus have the effect of differentiating the relevant proposal from the pro
posed adoption of any other potential deal point within the parties'
bargaining zone. Extending Schelling's focal point analysis to the use of
boilerplate, the latter may represent a "kind of default" in negotiation.144

142. Distinct from its coordination functions, the proposed use of boilerplate language may
help to define the parameters for bargaining over a given term given the cognitive limitations of
bargaining parties. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 30, at 362-63; Korobkin, supra note 10, at
1 608. A drafting party's proposed terms may thus define a point around which subsequent negotia
tions will be conducted, for the simple reason that everything in a contract cannot be negotiated
from scratch. Cf Hill & King, supra note 43 (suggesting potential for form language to be used as
mechanism to insert favorable language into contract). This may be especially true in the complex
negotiations of interest herein. In such negotiations, some narrowing in the scope of bargaining over
any particular term may be essential, given the total number of terms under negotiation. Cf Nellie
Eunsoo Choi, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Common Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 50, 65 (2003) ("Wasting time by
bickering over detailed language in a forty-page agreement that primarily addresses scenarios that
may never occur . . . is especially annoying to an action-oriented businessman."). Yet there is noth
ing specific to boilerplate that causes it to serve this narrowing function. Any proposed term may
have the effect of constraining the universe of potentially negotiated outcomes. But see infra notes
1 60-1 67 and accompanying text.
143. Goodpaster analogously refers to the offering of reasons, rationales, or justifications for a
particular proposal. These, he suggests, make a position "more credible and, therefore, harder for
the other party to assail or counter without providing equal or more persuasive reasons for his or her
position." Goodpaster, supra note 1 7, at 345-46; see also note 1 14. It also bears noting, however,
that credible insistence on the nature of some point as boilerplate may be effective in shaping expec
tations, even if it is not actually boilerplate.
1 44. See SCHELLING, supra note I . Besides helping to influence the particular equilibrium
ultimately emerging from bargaining parties' negotiations over any particular term, boilerplate may
also be used to define which issues are subject to, and which issues are excluded from, negotiation.
See Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 1 3. By using standardized terms in certain parts of a contract
but not others, a drafting party may be able to effectively de-emphasize the former. Selective use of
boilerplate in a draft contract alongside tailored or even completely open-ended terms may thus
define the bounds of the overall negotiation between the parties. In colloquial terms, it may help to
define what is on the table. Cf Kahan & Klausner, supra note 30, at 362-63 (suggesting utility of
initial control of terms given anchoring biases); Korobkin, supra note 1 0, at 1608; Simpson, supra
note 1 33, at 1 162.
One can visualize this possibility with an eye to standard-form consumer contracts. A form
leaving price, quantity, and the warranty term open can be expected to invite negotiation as to each
of these terms. By contrast, a form with blanks only for price and quantity is at least relatively less
likely to prompt negotiation over the warranty. Instead, the boilerplate standard will be left to define
that term. Compare Austerlitz German Shepherd Dogs Puppy Guarantee and Contract,
http://www.austerlitzshepherds.com/austerlitzlcontract.html (form agreement for purchase of dogs,
with only two blank terms) (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) with Janet Joers, Sample Puppy Contract,
http://www.chowchowcentral.com/cccpupcontract.htm (last visited Nov. 1 5 , 2005) (contract with
additional blanks). Even if this were not always true-and one would not expect it to be so--it
suggests some strategic benefit to the selective use of boilerplate in seeking to influence the scope of
any given contract negotiation.
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The use of boilerplate for strategic advantage is readily apparent within
this conception. In essence, the proposed use of boilerplate creates a basis
145
for a party to insist on its position; it allows that party to hold its ground.
Unlike other bargaining positions, as to which the marginal demand for con
cessions might be expected to bear fruit, boilerplate may serve as a focal
point from which a counterparty ultimately seeking agreement may be less
146
likely to expect further movement.
Naturally, such an approach assumes the boilerplate term to be relatively
favorable to the relevant party. Given such circumstances, however, the boi
lerplate may-as a strategic matter-represent the best offer and best
outcome likely to be secured. If, by contrast, the boilerplate is unfavorable
to a party--or, more specifically, is worse than the deal they can expect to
otherwise secure-boilerplate ceases to be of coordinative utility. The boi
lerplate need not constitute a party's optimal preference; it simply needs to
be sufficiently attractive (among the universe of possibilities) that its effi
cacy as a bargaining position renders it optimal. Considering our event risk
covenant example, a debtor's proposed adoption of a standard-form dual
trigger covenant constitutes a more difficult bargaining position to displace,
even if less favorable to the debtor than a hostile control change covenant. In
essence, boilerplate allows the debtor to avoid even worse outcomes.
Boilerplate may thus offer an "indirect means" for advancing one's ne
gotiating position. More concretely, the proposed use of boilerplate may
allow a party "to convince the other side that [its] maximum expectation is
1 47
really [its] minimum breaking-off point."
This coordination function of boilerplate may be especially important
1 48
when tied to a party's concession on a given term. Behind every negoti
ated concession is the (rational) fear that it opens the door to a cascade of
further demands for concessions: "If you're willing to give that much, why
not this much more?" In this situation, the proposed use of boilerplate may
be especially useful. It may help to shape expectations that the given con-

1 45.
See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 70; cf Goodpaster, supra note 1 7, at 342-43 ("[T]he
competitive negotiator wants to persuade the other side about the firmness of [its] own assened
bottom line."). Of course, the assertion of the boilerplate or otherwise standard term as one's reser
vation point is itself cheap talk, at some level. It simply appears less cheap than any other potential
negotiating position.
1 46.
See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 70-7 1 ("Most bargaining situations ultimately involve
some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail
to reach agreement at all. In such a situation, any potential outcome is one from which at least one
of the parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement, and
very often the other party knows it. Any potential outcome is therefore one that either party could
have improved by insisting; yet he may have no basis for insisting, since the other knows or suspects
that he would rather concede than do without agreement. Each party's strategy is guided mainly by
what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal
thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat.").
1 47.

See EDWARD PETERS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 1 1 2 ( 1 955).

1 48.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 30.
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49
cession is not susceptible to further backsliding. 1 As a defensive tool, then,
150
boilerplate may serve to cabin negotiated concessions.
By way of example, when debtor and lender are negotiating the enumer
ated triggers in a dual trigger covenant, the debtor can be expected to favor a
short list and the lender a long one. In ultimately giving way -perhaps in
exchange for some other concession-a debtor does well to fall back on the
1 51
standard list of triggering events. A ready answer is then available to the
proposed addition of a major asset acquisition trigger, which is not ordinar
ily included. If the proposed concession includes a non-standard provision
for relief from an asset acquisition by the debtor, by contrast, the lender's
subsequent proposal of yet further non-standard triggers becomes signifi. 52
.
cant1y more diffiicult to resist. 1
153
Yet boilerplate may also be important offensively. When the seemingly
ascendant party to a negotiation proposes the use of boilerplate, it acts to
create an expectation that further concessions will not be demanded if its
proposed terms are accepted.

149.
In this vein, Ben-Shahar and White observe a dramatic deviation between auto manufac
turers' contracts with information technology suppliers and the standard contract the manufacturers
use with all other suppliers. Notably, the former are more generous not only on intellectual property
issues but also more generally. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 97S-79. This can readily
be understood within the coordination dynamic I describe. Once the manufacturers deviate from the
"hard and fast" form on intellectual property questions, holding their ground becomes more difficult
as a general matter.

I SO .

"The same point is illustrated when one tries to give up cigarettes or liquor. 'Just one

little drink,' is a notoriously unstable compromise offer; and more people give up cigarettes alto
gether than manage to reach a stable compromise at a small daily quota. Once the virgin principle is
gone, there is no confidence in any resting point, and the expectation is relapse. The very recogni
tion of this keeps attention focused on the point of complete abstinence." SCHELLING, supra note I ,
at 1 12.

1 5 1 . If a debtor is agreeing to triggers, thus, it ought to agree to the boilerplate enumeration of
( 1 ) the acquisition of a specified percentage of the debtor's stock, (2) replacement of a majority of
the board of directors by a proxy challenge, (3) sale of substantially all the debtor's assets, (4) a
merger or consolidation, or (5) the payment of dividends or repurchase of shares over a specified
percentage within a defined period. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra
note 2, at 955.
1 52. See id. at 96 1 . The same might be said of the enumeration of events triggering anti
dilution measures. By falling back on a list providing relief in the face of stock splits, stock divi
dends, and non-cash dividends, but not the equally standard case of warrants, a lender faces the
heightened prospect of arriving at an even shorter list. See Kahan, supra note S, at 1 53.

I 53.

Schelling captures this potential in his identification of rivers as focal points in military

conflict. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 26; see also SCHELLING, supra note 1 , at 71 ("If some
troops have retreated to the river in our map, they will expect to be expected to make a stand. This is
the one spot to which they can retreat without necessarily being expected to retreat further, while, if
they yield any further, there is no place left where they can be expected to make a determined stand.
Similarly, the advancing party can expect to force the other to retreat to the river without having his
advance interpreted as an insatiable demand for unlimited retreat. There is stability at the river-and
perhaps nowhere else.").
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D. Boilerplate in Tacit Bargaining
A more stylized version of the foregoing pattern may also play out in
1 54
contracting circumstances akin to Schelling's "tacit bargaining." In these
circumstances, communication is absent, and there is consequently no nego
tiation in the ordinary sense. On the other hand, divergent interests mean
that bargaining persists. Recall Schelling's example, in which separated
parachutists need to locate one another but stand at different distances from
various points on their common map. Because the distance between each
point and each parachutist is likely to be shorter for one parachutist and
longer for the other, their preferred meeting places will necessarily diverge.
Yet because they must meet, each will travel the greater or lesser distance
1 55
necessary for them to do so.
A tacit bargaining of sorts might be said to arise in take-it-or-leave-it
contracting dy namics. Most obviously, this would include standard-form
consumer contracts in which no mechanism of communication is available.
Even if communication could occur, moreover, the non-negotiable terms of
the proposed contract put the offeree in essentially the same position. But
similar patterns of tacit bargaining can also be found beyond adhesion con
tracts. Among sophisticated parties, for example, the case of publicly issued
debt is suggestive. With such debt, the relevant bond indenture is drafted by
the issuer, who then presents its terms-as part and parcel of the issuance
to potential creditors. The latter then choose to accept the terms (that is, pur
chase the bond) or reject to them. Communication is unavailable and
1�
counterproposa1s cannot be offered.
In analyzing coordination dynamics, Schelling posited that a party
whose interests lay closer to the likely focal point for decision might favor
157
non-communication. In the absence of communication, such a party can
predictably assume the available focal point will emerge as the equilibrium
solution. Given as much, the closer party might even attempt to interrupt
158
communication. By doing so, the party secures a relatively preferred solu
tion. As only a focal solution can effectively coordinate the players'
expectations absent communication, non-communication might be better for
the closer party.
One might conceive of the public issuance of debt and analogous exam
ples of seriatim bargaining of a sort as having a similar quality. In this
dynamic, the issuer or other drafting party can exercise discretion to define
1 54.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 22.

155.

See id. a t 22-23.

1 56.

Auto manufacturers' standard-form contracts with their suppliers, which are not subject
to bargaining, are another example. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2.

1 57.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 23.

See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 1 46 ("When the outcome depends on coordination, the
1 58.
timely destruction of communication may be a winning tactic. When a man and his wife are arguing
by telephone over where to meet for dinner, the argument is won by the wife if she simply an
nounces where she is going and hangs up. And the status quo is often preserved by a person who
evades discussion of alternatives, even to the extent of simply turning off his hearing aid.").
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its terms, naturally favoring those it prefers. As no rejoinder can be offered,
the resulting terms are necessarily focal. If any solution is to be reached, it

must be on the drafter 's terms. Of course, creditors may elect to "leave it,"
rather than "take it." If they decide to take it, however, they take it as is.

Yet this proves too much. Any term elected by the drafter-and not boi
9
With non-boilerplate

lerplate alone-would have such a focal effect. 1 5

terms, however, the propensity to "leave it" may be significantly greater.
6
Boilerplate terms might therefore have significantly greater focal power. 1 0
Non-drafting parties faced with non-negotiable boilerplate terms may be

more prone to accept such terms as fair, reasonable, or otherwise legiti
161
mate.
As recently explored by Bob Scott, experimental analysis of
62
Ultimatum Game patterns of play supports this possibility. 1 In this dy

namic, one player proposes an allocation of a certain monetary sum, which

the other player can either accept or reject, the latter resulting in no payoff

to either party. The receiving party should rationally accept any offer that is

put forward. In reality, however, players consistently reject offers below a
certain proportion. Thus, there would appear to be some assessment of fair

ness in the receiving party 's evaluation of offers, which impacts its ultimate
63

willingness to accept proposed terms. 1

One might predict such a dy namic in the use of boilerplate terms in
64
The use of

bond indentures and other contracts not subject to negotiation. 1

standard dual trigger event risk covenants in a bond indenture, as opposed to

manager-friendly hostile control change covenants or creditor-friendly pure
165
rating decline covenants,
offers a potential example. Given the nature of

public issuance and the resulting lack of communication, the choice among

1 59.

See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1 586.

1 60. See Korobkin, supra note 6 1 , at 1 8 1 9 ("Given that a wide bargaining zone provides for a
range of possible deal points and that fairness in surplus allocation is a dominant norm, adherence to
the fairness norm could theoretically substitute for bargaining . . "); see also id. at 1 8 25-29.
.

161.

See id. a t 1 8 1 7- 1 9; see also note 1 14.

1 62. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1 64 1 (2003). To related effect, Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser have identified the tendency
of what they term "faim-:: s s conventions" to favor contract simplicity. See Eggleston et al., supra
note 17, at 1 1 4-15. "[If the parties] have a sense of what is a fair division of the surplus, this sense
of fairness may provide a focal point around which they bargain, enabling them to reach agreement
quickly." Id.
1 63.
See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 968-69. Analogously, Claire Hill has sug
gested that attorneys' deviations from familiar forms may induce strong resistance from
counterparties. See Hill, supra note 2, at 69, 68 n. 19.
164. Boilerplate, along with other standard terms, may thus address the need identified by
Korobkin to reach consensus on the measurement of fair results. See Korobkin, supra note 61, at
1 820, 1 827-28.
165. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 952, 955.
Other potential occasions for this pattern of boilerplate usage might also be identified, including use
of the older conversion price standard rather than the newer market price standard in anti-dilution
provisions. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 687 n.76. More closely approximating the Ultimatum
Game pattern, a sovereign debt issuer might utilize the standard 66.7% requirement for alterations to
the pari passu clause, rather than a more favorable 50% standard, on the premise that the standard
figure might be seen as fairer, notwithstanding the lack of negotiation.
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potential event risk covenants is the issuer's alone. Yet a bargaining dynamic
remains because of the demands of the marketplace. In the face of this dy
namic, use of the standard provision may be important. Potential creditors,
deprived of the opportunity to negotiate, might plausibly be expected-in
line with the observed expectation of fairness among contracting parties-to
find a standard dual trigger covenant . significantly more palatable a focal
point for agreement.
When a proposed contract term is standard, then, a non-drafting party
may consider the absence of negotiation less problematic. This may even be
true in the presence of significant bargaining power. Potential creditors of a
relatively high-risk corporate debtor may be amenable to boilerplate terms
in a public issuance even when they could have readily secured more favor
able terms-a pure rating decline covenant, for example-in a private loan
agreement. Such boilerplate terms might be considered fair even if less ad
166
vantageous than potential alternatives.
Parties with more limited
bargaining power, then, might well be expected to prefer a pattern of tacit
bargaining, in the face of relatively favorable boilerplate. This approach may
allow them to achieve otherwise unattainable bargaining outcomes. Through
the strategic use of boilerplate, they may literally achieve more than they
167
could have bargained for.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC BOILERPLATE
In both its signaling and coordination functions, boilerplate may serve
an important strategic role in bargaining. In the right hands and the right
circumstances, boilerplate constitutes a weapon of choice in contract nego
tiation. At least in part, this may help to explain-and to encourage-the use
of boilerplate by sophisticated parties. Further, it has potential implications
for the evolution of boilerplate and the nature of contract bargaining, among
other things. To conclude, some of the more notable implications of strate
gic boilerplate are suggested below.
A. Boilerplate and Change
As discussed in the legal literature, boilerplate would seem to possess a
168
somewhat static and passive quality. It simply is. Within a strategic con
ception, by contrast, boilerplate is created, shaped, and used. If boilerplate
has signaling and coordination effects, significant bargaining advantage may

1 66.
This dynamic is likely to be familiar to any lawyer who has sat down for a closing on a
new home. While numerous terms contained in the note may appear onerous or overreaching, these
are nonetheless likely to be deemed acceptable if they are standard terms. Some presumption of
fairness, in essence, is ascribed to such terms. By contrast, tailored terms are likely to be subject to
much sharper scrutiny. See Korobkin, supra note IO, at 1 605-09 (observing resistance to alteration
of terms in form agreements, even to conform with relevant default rule).
1 67.

Cf Korobkin, supra note 85, at 1 205--06.

See, e.g., John E. Murray, The Definitive "Battle of the Forms ": Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L.
& CoM. I , 1 1 (2000) .
1 68.
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follow from its substantive placement. Self-interested parties would there
fore do well to define or redefine contracting norms to fall at Kaldor-Hicks
169
optimal points within potential contracting spectra.
While relevant to contracting parties generally, the opportunity to exer
cise such influence is likely to be especially available to sophisticated
parties. As repeat players, sophisticated parties have both increased oppor
tunity to progressively shift the prevailing norm to a preferred point and
strong incentives to do so. B y allocating resources to introducing, shifting,
and refining boilerplate, they may secure a heightened share of the contrac
tual surplus across multiple contracts.
Sophisticated parties might be expected to encourage such shifts in a va
riety of ways. Most obvious is their consistent use of particular terms.
Across a succession of contracts, repeat players may significantly influence
an industry norm. This impact might be built upon by the use of preferred
boilerplate in progressively expanding categories of contracts. In this way,
repeat players may encourage the migration of preferred contracting norms
170
across distinct contracting subjects.
Most systematically, sophisticated parties might use various forms of
organized drafting to encourage shifts in boilerplate to favor their interests.
Model covenant and similar model term drafting committees--often of one
or another bar association-may be the most common venue for such group
171
Industry specific form agreements or model
172
terms, often a product of industry associations, are another.
In either fo
exercises in contract design.

rum, even dominant contracting parties may do well to invest in efforts to
influence the contracting norms that emerge.
The possibility of boilerplate evolution through organized drafting helps
to highlight a final point of interest. While the emphasis herein is on the
strategic use-and hence design--of boilerplate by bargaining parties, third
parties may also have an important role in the strategic dynamic of bargain
ing outlined above. This is most readily apparent with reference to the
coordination functions of boilerplate, in which the focal effect of the pre
vailing norm is independent of the source of that norm. Thus, a third party's
influence on the norm can play an important role in bargaining outcomes.
To this effect, Schelling spoke of the power of mediators to influence out
comes notwithstanding their lack of formal authority to dictate any
173
decision.
In the case of boilerplate, one might conceive broadly represen
tative bar associations as operating-at least on occasion-in this fashion.

1 69.

See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 1 5 , at 23-24.

Cf Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
1 70.
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REv. 95 ( 1 974).
1 7 1 . See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 1 5 , at 23-24; Kahan & Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation, supra note 2, at 76 1--64. The American Bar Association's Commentaries, supra
note 49, are a prime example of this pattern. See Klausner, supra note 7, at 8 1 6-- 18.
172. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 1 04 MICH.
L. REv. 1075, 1 078-81 (2006).
1 73 .

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 26, 28; see also Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100.
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Yet relevant third parties might also include individuals or institutions with
incentives to favor particular outcomes, even if not parties to relevant trans
174
actions.
Consumer groups might be one example. One might even
conceive the American Bar Foundation's preparation of the arguably lender
175
friendly provisions of the Commentaries in this light.
A strategic theory of boilerplate suggests a more dynamic pattern of boi
lerplate development. Boilerplate can be expected to change over time. Such
change is not necessarily a product of passive evolution, moreover, but may
also be driven by affirmative investment of the time and resources necessary
to effectuate it. If boilerplate serves significant signaling and coordination
functions, sophisticated players likely to engage in recurrent contracting do
1 76
well to seek influence in shaping prevailing contracting norms.
B. Rethinking Bargaining Skill
Following directly from the analysis in Section A is a potential need to
rethink the nature of bargaining power. In essence, both the signaling and
coordination functions of boilerplate suggest that bargaining skill (and bar
gaining power) in negotiations may not be exclusively about a party's ability
177
or capacity within the negotiation, as we conventionally think of it. Rather,
a significant aspect of bargaining skill and power may be the capacity to lay
the groundwork for negotiation. At least some part of a party's bargaining
power may tum on the pre-negotiation definition of relevant boilerplate
including in the ways outlined above. In Schelling's terms, an essential skill
(and fruitful task) may therefore be "to set the stage in such a way as to give
1 74.

See Davis, supra note 172, at 1088.

See Simpson, supra note 1 33, at 1 1 63; see also id. at 1 1 66 (offering example). While
Simpson suggests negotiating against the lender-friendly terms contained in the Commentaries, this
is rendered more difficult by the very fact of those terms' inclusion in the Commentaries. See id. at
1 75.

1 1 67 .
1 76. A s the implications o f a strategic theory o f boilerplate for boilerplate evolution suggest,
such a theory speaks broadly to the important trends toward standardization in the world today.
Across an array of technological, financial, and other sectors of the world economy, greater attention
to the strategic dynamic of standardization is in order.
1 77.
See Russell Korobkin, Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 867,
867 (2004) ("[R]elative bargaining power stems entirely from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly
or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: 'I will walk away from the negotiating table without
agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand. ' The source of the ability to make such a
threat, and therefore the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that he has a desirable
alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a 'BATNA.' "); cf Bratton, supra note 2, at
688 (referring to traditional bargaining power rationale for adoption of particular term); Roger
Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. B EHAV. SCIENTIST 1 49, 149 ( 1983)
(noting confluence of negotiating power and military power in international relations: "At the inter
national level, negotiating power is typically equated with military power.").
The foregoing analysis thus resonates with Daniel Bamhizer's suggestion to expand our as
sessment of bargaining power beyond "ad hoc generalizations drawn from the class struggles of the
last 1 50 years." See Daniel D. Bamhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 39,
142 (2005). These include a party's "alternatives," "opportunity to negotiate," and "traditional
status-based classifications." See id. at 143; see also Adler & Silverstein, supra note 1 1 2, at 20 (not
ing need to go beyond parties' BATNAs to consider "what each party can do for and to the other,"
and their related dependence on one another).
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178
prominence to some particular outcome that would be favorable." With the
use of boilerplate and similar focal points, thus, the "focus for agreement
[may] not just reflect the balance of bargaining powers" but also may af
179
firmatively "provide[] bargaining power to one side or the other."
In the case of signaling, to begin, the ability of a party to shape contract
ing choices in binary terms may help to enhance the signaling effect of
180
particular contracting proposals. More interestingly, a repeat player might
find utility in defining the prevailing contracting norm downwards, even
181
independent of the party's substantive contracting preferences. Bey ond the
substantive benefits, a lower bar may enhance the signal arising from any
favorable deviation that the relevant party can consistently make.
As to the coordination functions of boilerplate, the same principles ap
ply. Here, one would expect efforts by sophisticated parties to define the
prevailing norm in terms proximate to their preferred choices. By doing so,
they enhance the prospect of securing such favorable terms. Most interest
ingly, this is true independent of the conventional bargaining power of the
party. Thus, in David's bargaining with Goliath, David might be expected to
secure potentially significant advantage by having helped to define a con
tracting norm closer to his preferences. Echoing the above discussion of
changes in boilerplate, moreover, it is notable that David may have greater
capacity to influence the contracting norm than the outcome of his head-to
head negotiations with Goliath. Thus, intermediately sized market partici
pants with the foresight to plan ahead and the resources necessary to
participate in organized drafting projects may be particularly advantaged by
participation in such efforts.
Even relatively "weak" bargaining parties can gain advantage along the
aforementioned lines, even if they cannot establish preferred terms as the
prevailing standard. Assuming boilerplate favorable to its potential counter
parties, a relatively weak party 's task need not be to establish new
boilerplate but simply to undermine the focal power of existing boiler
182
plate.
A party does so, in essence, through the creation of competing
boilerplate and consequent destruction of the salience of the prevailing
norm. There is no need to replace existing boilerplate; rather, a bargaining
183
party need simply displace it as the dominant norm.

1 78. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 29. To analogous effect is Marc Galanter's analysis of
how repeat players control the nature of the law by controlling what cases are appealed. See Gal
anter, supra note 170. Russell Korobkin 's identification of "zone definition" as a significant element
of negotiation might also be noted. See Korobkin, supra note 6 1 , at 1 792-94.
1 79.

SCHELLING, supra note 1 , at 68.

1 80.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

181.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

1 82.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 29 n.8.

1 83. In this vein, some analogy might be made to Klausner's suggestion of the power of
menus of corporate charter terms, in undermining network effects in corporate law. See Klausner,
supra note 7, at 839--4 1 .
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A final element of bargaining skill to be added to our conventional ac
count arises particularly from the coordination functions of boilerplate.

Specifically, the capacity to bind oneself-or "self-commitment," as Schel
ling terms it 1 84-may be a significant factor in a party 's bargaining
success. 1 85 As described above, if a party can credibly assert its commitment

to a particular contract term across varied circumstances--even those in

which its own incentives v
-it may be able to more effectively insist on
�
that term in any given case. 1 8 Its hands, or so the story goes, are tied. This is

true, moreover, regardless of the breadth of usage of the relevant term
among other parties.

C. The Tyranny ofBig Concessions
Boilerplate's role in coordination may also place constraints on the will
ingness of bargaining parties to offer limited concessions. Recall that the

proposed use of boilerplate is beneficial on account of the focal character of
the proposed equilibrium behind the proposal. Given as much, even small

deviations from boilerplate are dangerous. Once a small concession from

boilerplate is made, the ability of a party to hold to its new position is sig
nificantly undermined. 1 87 If the party 's commitment is not to the exact terms of
the boilerplate, then concessions beyond the first become more difficult to
resist. Expectations of further concessions can therefore be expected to rise. 1 88

Small concessions may consequently give up the game. Abandoning the

focal point may open a party up to potential collapse of its bargaining posi
9
tion. 1 8 In Schelling's terms, given the "dependence of a 'focal point'

solution on some characteristic that distinguishes it qualitatively from the

surrounding alternatives . . . . small concessions [may be] less likely than

large ones."190

In certain circumstances, then, large concessions may be more readily

made than smaller ones. Shifts to an alternative point with its own focal

power are not subject to the same pressure toward further concessions.

Rather, such points-for example, some alternative standard applicable to
the same issue--enjoy credibility similar to the original bargaining position.

Such positions with distinct focal power, however, are generally likely to fall

1 84.

See Schelling, supra note 30, at 286.

See id. at 282. In Schelling's terms, the "power to constrain an adversary may depend on
the power to bind oneself.'' SCHELLING, supra note l , at 22.
1 85.

1 86. In recording contracts, for example, studios have long required a contract term in which
the recorded product is denoted a "work-for-hire" to avoid the strictures of the 1 976 Copyright Act.
See Phillip W. Hall Jr., Smells Like Slavery: Unconscionability in Recording Industry Contracts, 25
HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 89, 2 1 0-16 (2002). Even musicians with significant bargaining
power may have at least some part of that advantage undermined by the studios' consistent charac
terization of all sound recordings as works-for-hire.
1 87.

See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.

1 88.

See id.

1 89.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 30.

1 90.

See SCHELLING, supra note l , at 1 1 1 .
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at some remove from the party's original position. For this reason, one
might reasonably predict a peculiar dynamic in which large concessions are
191
more readily made than smaller ones.

D. Bargaining and Adhesion in a Strategic World
The literature of adhesion contracts-standard-form consumer con
192
Much of the discussion of boilerplate among legal

tracts-is voluminous.

scholars, in fact, arises in the context of that literature. The above analysis of
boilerplate, however, suggests a complex power dynamic at work in its use,
193
even outside the adhesion contract context. More importantly, and by con
trast with prevailing transaction-cost and network-effect theories of the use
of boilerplate outside of consumer contracts, it suggests an aggressively
strategic use of boilerplate even among similarly situated parties.
Following naturally from this, it might be said that boilerplate gener
ally-whatever power dynamic is evident on the face of the relevant parties'
interaction-may raise adhesion-style issues. Some of the very concerns
about power, and even coercion, that are commonly raised with reference to
194
adhesion contracts may also deserve attention outside that context.
If boi

lerplate terms enj oy significant focal power, it is useful to appreciate their
implications for contracting power generally.
This should not be overstated. I do not mean to suggest that the use of

boilerplate generally-even among differently situated parties-is involun
tary. To the contrary, both among sophisticated parties and even between
producers and consumers, most boilerplate is likely voluntary in some rea
sonable

sense.

My

more

limited

point

is

that

our

sensitivity

to

involuntariness in consumer contracts may have some relevance in peer-to
peer contracting as well. In essence, we do well to be cognizant of such is
sues in cases in which the focal power of a prevailing term is sufficient to

constitute the type of market power we conventionally expect to find in
standard-form consumer contracts.

E. The Missing Focal Points in Law
Given the nature of bargaining as a coordination game, it is hardly sur
prising to find extensive references to focal points in legal scholarship. With
limited exceptions, however, these references overlook the most important
implications of Schelling's focal point analysis. Echoing legal scholars' inat
tention to the divergence between Ronald Coase's actual arguments and the
1 9 1 . Kyle Logue suggests as a potential example of this pattern the tendency of commercial
insurers to have alternative standard forms, the first of which represents its opening position and the
second its fallback.
192.
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Korobkin, supra note 85.
1 93. To analogous effect, see Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 23-24 (noting potential
antitrust concerns in design of default terms).
194.

See Gilo & Porat, supra note 1 2.
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focal points are omnipresent in le

gal scholarship but in ways that arguably miss their most significant
functions.
To begin, legal scholars tend to acknowledge a role for focal points pri
marily when there is no conflict between the parties (that is, pure
196
coordination). Yet conflict was exactly what Schelling's focal point analy
197
sis was intended to address.
While focal points may be the key to a
resolution when conflict is absent but communication is impossible, Schel
ling's essential project was to highlight the utility of focal points in solving
.
198
. d-motive games.
IIlJXe
Even beyond this observation, talk of focal points in the legal literature
almost exclusively speaks to circumstances in which communication is lack
ing. Obviously, this is unsurprising, given the discussion above. Yet even
where conflict is introduced, tacit bargaining tends to be the emphasis. The
most interesting functions of focal points, however, arise in the presence of
199
communication-in explicit bargaining.
For it is here that our instincts
tend to mislead us, suggesting erroneously that communication should suf
fice to remedy coordination failures.
Finally, and perhaps as a result of the foregoing, focal points in the legal
200
They exist

scholarship tend to have a relatively passive quality to them.

rather than are created; even when they are created, they are not a product of
unilateral action undertaken for strategic purposes. A more active and ag
gressive dynamic of focal points, however, follows directly from their role
in the presence of both conflict and communication. Further, it is arguably
such a strategic dynamic of focal points that has greatest implications for,
and application to, legal analysis.
The foregoing analysis of boilerplate's coordination functions thus in
vites a broader awareness of, and attention to, focal points among legal
scholars. Across an array of subjects, Schelling's focal point analysis may
offer valuable insight. In particular, when coordination is required, focal
strategies-in the hands of both public regulators and private competitors
201

may offer important devices for the shaping of player incentives.

1 95.
See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism ", 99 YALE L.J.
6 1 1 ( 1 989); see also Westbrook, supra note 27, at 105 n.277.
1 96. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment A rbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1 1 87, 1232 ( 1 993) ("This problem instantiates a broader problem, described by the
economist Thomas Schelling as that of achieving tacit coordination between parties with identical
interests when communication is impossible.").
1 97.

See Schelling, supra note 2 1 , at 19.

1 98.

See id. at 23.

1 99. See SCHELLING, supra note I , at 68; see also Eisenberg, supra note 1 1 0, at 65 1 . Schel
ling has suggested that "[t]he 'coordination' of expectations [in explicit bargaining] is analogous to
the 'coordination' of behavior when communication is cut off; and, in fact, they both involve noth
ing more nor less than intuitively perceived mutual expectations." SCHELLING, supra note I , at 7 1 .
200.

See, e.g., Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100; Whytock, supra note 1 4 1 .

20 1 .

See, e.g. , Ahdieh, supra note 14.
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CONCLUSION

For all the talk of boilerplate among legal scholars, further attention to
its widespread use is in order. Particularly among sophisticated parties, per

sistent adherence to contracting norms, as opposed to the tailoring of
Pareto--or even Kaldor-Hicks--optimal terms remains inadequately theo

rized. I offer a strategic theory of boilerplate in such circumstances.

Through its signaling and coordination functions, the proposed use of boi

lerplate-and occasionally deviation from it-may enable a bargaining
party to advance its interests.

Broadly, boilerplate may serve important communicative functions, oth

erwise constrained by the intertwined dynamic of coordination and conflict

at work in contract bargaining. On occasion, this may serve to enhance joint

contractual surplus through the dissemination of information that advances
the collective interests of parties. At least as commonly, however, the pro

posed use of boilerplate may serve to maximize a particular party 's share of
the contractual surplus by encouraging agreement at a coordination equilib

rium more favorable to its desired outcome.

Appreciation of such a strategic role for boilerplate holds various impli

cations. It requires us to rethink the nature of bargaining skill and power and
counsels some alteration in our expectations about patterns of contract bar
gaining. In the right circumstances, large concessions may be easier to offer

than small concessions. Further, if boilerplate enjoys significant focal

power, concerns of involuntariness may have at least some application to
contracting outside the standard-form consumer contract.

It bears noting, moreover, that the strategic role of boilerplate may

arise even beyond the sophisticated parties of interest herein. Thus, boiler
plate's strategic functions shape contracting generally. In any given case,

boilerplate may be more or less prone to play a signaling or coordination

function. Those functions, however, are not inherently limited to the inter
action of sophisticated parties.

Perhaps most importantly, the foregoing analysis offers a treatment of

focal points as instrumental and even aggressive tools of engagement among

contracting parties. In this, it deviates from the widespread discussion of

focal points in a passive light. Given the affirmative power of focal points in
the hands of both regulators and private parties, however, greater attention to

their role and use is in order. Such attention may be particularly deserved
with regard to the role of focal points in the growing patterns of standardiza

tion driving the global economy today. At a minimum, the foregoing

analysis counsels greater awareness among contracting parties of the power

of boilerplate as a bargaining tool. By influencing the shape of boilerplate

and engaging in its selective use, parties to contract negotiations may secure
significant advantage.
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